مجموعة ١٠٩/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. معاهدة التحالف الأنجلو-سوفييتية-فارسية،١٩٤٢." [ظ‎‎٦‎٢] (٤٤٢/١٢٤)

2
the Allied occupation, the manner in which it was effected is not to be easily
distinguished by Persians from the “ treachery ” of the attacks without warning
effected by the Germans and the Japanese; and that consequently one of the
moral arguments on which we build our case against the Axis and its associates
carries little or no weight in this country.
4. All foreigners, whether official or not. who have an opportunity to talk
with the Shah, come away with a good impression. Even the Soviet Ambassador
seems to consider him a sensible young man. He has the merit which not all his
Ministers share, of having decided definitely to side with the Allies whatever
happens. With one or two exceptions, Persians who side with the Allies convey
an impression that, if they have burnt their boats, they have retained, for use in
an emergency, a small but serviceable dinghy.
I have. &c.
(For the Minister),
E. E. CROWE.
P.S.—I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty’s Ambassadors
at Angora, Bagdad, Cairo and Kuibyshev, and to the Secretary to the Govern
ment of India in the External Affairs Department.
E. E. C.
Enclosure.
Interview vrith the Shnh, December' 8, 1941.
THE Shah said the treaty would be signed in a few days He then hoped to
bring about a much more intimate collaboration. They had been ineffective
hitherto in presenting the treaty in a favourable light to the country, but they were
not experts in propaganda. Would we help? He took exception to the recent
Times article which had seemed to say that British diplomacy had been weak in
pot forcing the treaty through more rapidly, and that the Persians were hanging
back waiting on events in Russia. He thought that was the wrong line for us to
take; it was a mistake for us to stress Persian hesitation; that was merely giving
the Germans material for propaganda. Rather should we stress our community
of interests, our interest in the preservation of Persian independence, our desire
to see Persia strong.
Neutrality was not possible nowadays. Persia was throwing in her lot with
us, and he would do his best to convince the country that that was in Persia’s
interest. He would try to give the country the clear policy that was so evidently
peeded. It was essential to restore morale in the army; to do that it was essential
that the army should feel that it had a part to play in the defence of Persia and
not merely to stand aside and look on if the Germans reached Persia. It must be
inspired with a determination to defend Persia against the Axis. That was
essential if morale was to be restored. And unless it was restored the army would
be useless even for internal security. We could help by propaganda to the effect
that although Persia now needed a small army in virtue of the alliance, it was
essential that that army should be efficient not only for present needs, but with a
view to expansion after the war. We could help, too, by suggesting in our propa
ganda that we appreciated the wisdom of the order to the Persian army to cease
resistance as being in the best interest of Persia.
He much regretted the course events had taken. He felt sure that we could
have had all we wanted in this country without launching a sudden attack and
without bringing the Russians in if it had ever been made clear to his father
what it was we wanted and that we meant to have it. His father “ attendait
un geste de votre part." To present a note at 4 a.m. and at the same time launch
an unannounced attack was not what they had expected from us. But all that
must be forgotten if we were to achieve anything now. (In spite of this praise
worthy sentiment, he reverted to it several times. It obviously rankles.)
He hoped! that when the treaty was signed we would do something effective to
convince the Kurds that we were entirely out of sympathy with their attempt to
throw off the Persian yoke. He knew some Kurds had legitimate grievances and