مجموعة ١٠٩/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. معاهدة التحالف الأنجلو-سوفييتية-فارسية،١٩٤٢." [و‎‎٦‎٢] (٤٤٢/١٢٣)

' K
' n ~~ ■
<\
FILE COPV
<1
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY
\y&o£^\
S
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 595/14/34]
*~\W%
, \S>
ES
:t
7
-A.
7 £1^ ^
Section 1.
V
^zV R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—[Received January 7, 1942.)
January 7, 1942. ^
i**. <[y
6^-^
«p(L
Copy No. Qg
No.
ir,
211 .)
uOa/t
Tehran, December 20, ^
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note made by
military attache to His Majesty’s Legation after an interview with His Maj
the Shah. Major-General Fraser received an invitation to call on the Shah wit
the Minister for War, but when they appeared together the Shah dismissed the
Minister for W ar and had a private talk with the military attache.
2. I he Shah bears little resemblance to his father in character, but he
shares with him a deep interest in the Persian army—an interest fostered by
service in the army for two or three years. In my despatch No. 1 47 of the
9th October I reported that at my first audience'with the Shah k l the main feature
of the conversation was His Majesty's preoccupation with the army and his
illusions as to its value and to the role it could play in the present war.” In a
telegram based on the same interview I had reported that His Majesty talked
quite seriously about helping us with an army of 300.000 or 400,000 men. In
subsequent talks with myself and others the Shah has shown a keener sense of
proportion, but the interest he takes in the army has always been obvious, and
in the interview recorded in the enclosure to the present despatch he has treated
the subject with some wisdom. It will be remembered that the Cabinet objected
to the provision about the Persian army in the original draft of the treaty of
alliance, and asked that the role of the army should be limited to the maintenance
of internal security; and that the Foreign Office, while they accepted the proposal,
expressed surprise that the Persian Government could make the humiliating
proposal that the Persian army should not defend its territory in case of a
German invasion. A few days before the treaty was initialled the Minister for
Foreign Affairs reopened the subject, and asked me what the Allies would be
prepared to do (in the way of supplying arms and equipment) if the Persian
Government accepted the original draft of the treaty : there were some members
of the Cabinet who thought that the maintenance of internal security was a mean
task for an army, and regretted their request for the limitation of the Persian
army to that role. I said that it was late in the day to reopen this question,
which had been settled in the way the Cabinet had desired, and that the
conclusion of the treaty could certainly not be delayed while so difficult a question
as equipment, &c., for the Persian army was discussed. In any case. I said,
unless I could be assured that the request came from the Government I could not
take any official notice of it. M. Soheily never referred to it again, and I now
realise that he was speaking for the Shah, whose man he is, rather than for the
Cabinet who would hardly dare to insert in the treaty any provision which
required the Persian army to take part in any circumstances in a foreign war.
The Shah is wrong if he believes that his people share his opinion about the role
of the army, but he is right in thinking that the morale of the army needs to
be raised, even for the purpose of maintaining public security, and that it would
not be raised unless the army felt that it had a part to play in the defence of
Persia. Unfortunately, the morale of the army is so low that to raise it would
require more than the prospect of helping to defend Persia against a foreign
enemy, while general political considerations preclude the insertion of any such
provision in the treaty.
3. The Shah mentioned to Major-General Fraser a point on which I was
sure that he had strong feelings, though he had refrained, doubtless out of
politeness, from mentioning it to me, viz., the fact that the British attacked
Persia without warning. He had spoken to me with indignation on one occasion
of the unheralded Russian attack, and I could see by the way in which he steered
away from the subject that this ugly cap fitted His Majesty’s Government also.
It is well to remember that, however great the material gain we may obtain from
126—9]
RECd. POL. LZPt.
13 FEB 942
INDIA OFFICE