مجموعة ١١٠/٢٨ "بلاد فارس. المساعدة الاقتصادية والمالية من قبل الحكومة البريطانية." [و‎‎٨] (٧٩/١٥)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM
5.
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(iii) two teachers for Kerej Agricultural College, six for
seconoary schools and four for Tehiian technical cdlleges, a
P nes coach and a Boy Scout leader/ -it i^-hoped-4hat Professor
;ies, British Council^ advisor on technical education who
is now on a visit to Turkey will go to Tehran. If he does he
will no doubt make recommendations for sending technical pro-* .
fessors and lecturers 'from the United Kingdom.
(h) Medical Assistance .
I agree as to the desirability of maintaining this and
hope that Government of India and P.A.I.C. can continue to help.
Please let me know if you also require any assistance from,here.
(j) Persian Armed Forces. '
(i) We hope that procedure now agreed with United States
authorities (see correspondence ending with War Cabinet Offices*
telegram No. L.M.A.B. 110 of 2nd February to the J.S.M.
Washington) will ensure that Persian Army requirements are met
either from the United States sources or from P.A.I.C. I
understand that the Persian Army has already received consider
able quantities of motor transport and other material from
United States sources.
(ii) Rehabilitation of Persian Navy .
This question was recently examined, and I fear that the
position remains as described in No. 32 SAVING of 24th September,
(iii) Persian Air Force.
Training of pilots in the United Kingdom and the supply
of Arsons has already been arranged. Air Ministry's other
proposals should reach you shortly.
5. It is of course impossible to deal in any detail at
the present stage with the prospects of post-war yrade with
Persia, but the following general observations may be of some guidance
to you.
4. (a) In the period following the armistice with Germany,
British output will still be earmarEed on an extensive scale for
service requirements. Relief demands will also be heavy
for the goods Persia needs - viz, textiles, motor transport, drugs,
machinery. But we hope for some increase in the amounts available
for commercial exports.
(b) After the Japanese armistice there will be temporary
problems of unscrambling, but we then hope to increase our exports
very considerably.
(c) If we have to have recourse to directing our scarcer
exports. Persia should on present evidence qualify for a fairly
high priority. But in the meantime we shall have to keep the
Persians in play as best we can (see paragraph 2 (c)).
5. Anglo-Persian financial relations after the war will be
determined primarily by the need to secure the orderly and prudent
spending of Persian sterling balance^ Until these balances have
been liquidated, there will be no case for granting loans or
credits or for encouraging the investment of British capital in
Persia, It will therefore be for the Persians themselves to finance
any projects of capital works etc. which they may be planning.