مجموعة ٢٨ /٩٧ (١) "بلاد فارس. يوميّات. ملخصات استخباراتية خاصة بطهران" [و‎‎٢‎٦‎١] (٨٠٧/٥٢١)

A? H B W .
j 6/7o ;
1 1940 j
Su'n"iery of e eonver»«tlon between MIbb A.K. Lambton
! (reee Attached and Sarhang ( olonel) Hayyirl, romanndant
of the eeondrx^y llttrry School at Kerman shah, during e
^^cumey to Fernanahah, The natter repreeentB, no dcubt, the
^erecnrl opinion of the epeaker, but in view of the rarity of
any contact between a British eubject and en Iranian *r?ny officer
hie viewe are net without intereBt.
olonel Hayyiri, whe is an r nfantry Officer, fought in
the camnaigna in TTorthem ereia and subsequently se rved on the
Russo-Tranian frontier commlaalon cf 1926. He is a man of sound ^
common sense and reasonable outlook, though not cf brilliant
intelligence. ' J e is relatively well-infermed (for a erslan;
and appeared to ettempt tc ^udge matters from an impartial point
of view —- a rare quality among Persians.
1. In Colonel Hnyyiri** view, the future welfare of Tran
demanded a British victory in the present struggle. He had nc
wish that either Britain, Germany, or Russia should attain to
overwhelnin* predominance In ; urope on account cf the possible
repercueaiona such a develcpmtnt might hi ve in the policy of such
a dominant power in the last. Ht saw the interest of Iren tc
be in trie continuance in . uropt of great and small powers
balancing one another, with Great Britain holding, on the whole,
the dominant poetlion. Great Britain, he considered, would not
wish to interfere in Tran or to see any other country do ec. l ie
personal gymoathies also were with liberalism rather than
tctali tarianism.
2. He considered British policy in recent years had been
dieaetr/us. vhile giving full credit to Chamberlain far l
sincerity at uni oh, he th the tumiell P$li y was e mistake
and that a stand, and if necessary war, should have been made at
the time of the ( zechoelovak crisis. At present, in his view.
Great Britain had arrived at a dead end. An opportunity to make peace,
he thought, was missed at the time of the defeat of Belgium when
it could, so he thought, have been made without complete loss cf
prestige. How there was nothing for it but to continue the war
to the bitter end, and the devastation likely tc be caueed would
be such that it would tend to make an \iltimate victory barren and
useleee.
S. Hie attitude to the Shah was mixed. He condemned much
that is going on at the present day but attributed it rather to the
material the Shah had to deal with than to the Shah, for whom he
had a genuine admiration ©e an outstanding figure. He said the
progress of the country was the work of one men rlone, and suggested
that hictory was merely repeating itself, 1.e., that ©cvemt-nts in
Tran always tended tc be the work ol some outstanding loader and
net to spring from the neoplt, whom, on the contrary, that leader
had to drag along with him.
4. He admitted and deplored the moral degeneration cf the
people, which he attributed to the effects of Csjar rule rather
than to Pah lev! rule. His severe condemnation of the Cejari; mey
have been due to personal reasons, but it is not without interest
in view of the recent tendency which can be observed, even if
only faintly, tc compare the ahlavi regi e unfavourably with the
Cajer.
corruption, however, he said was worst than it hed been
twenty years rgo, and wgb still increasing. Gfliciele, i e said,
/were