مجموعة ٣٠/٩٠ "المطالبة الفارسية بجزيرة البحرين" [و‎‎٥‎١‎٠] (١٠٦٢/١٠٣٢)

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which has
colonies
tates
f i, is ’ more ^ ve J’ abundantly clear from historical precedents that the
theory of tne necessity for the formal consent of the dispossessed State is not one
has ever obtained international acceptance. The revolted Spanish
k VL v America were diplomatically recognised as independent
the United States Government in 1822 and by the British Government
“ man 7 years before their independence was formally admitted by Spain
The independence of , exas m 1837 and that of Panama in 1903 were recognised
by the United States and subsequently by Great Britain and other European
I oweis, loitg befoie Alexico and Colombia had ceased to look upon those
territoi les as revolted provinces. In these instances, to which others could if
necessary, be added, the effective establishment of independence was clearly
regarded by the Powers as the ruling factor in the situation, and the consent
ot the dispossessed btate was not held to be a condition sine qua non of a valid
transfer or acquisition of territory. In the case of Bahrein, whose sheikhs have
now been in treaty relations with His Majesty’s Government for more than a
century as independent rulers, it was thus not necessary for His Majesty’s
Government to await the consent of Persia before such recognition could be
accorded.
8. 1 he only other argument advanced by the Persian Government in
support of their claim is the statement that the sheikhs of Bahrein at some time
later than the end of the 18th century declared in writing their entire submission
and fidelity to the Persian Government, and that they paid tribute to the Persian
Government. Although the Persian Government do not give any details in
corroboration of this assertion, and although it would probably be difficult at
the present day to prove the authenticity of any documents which may be in
their possession, His Majesty’s Government are perfectly prepared to admit the
possibility that such documents may exist. They do not, however, consider that
the existence of such documents, or even evidence, were this forthcoming, of
payments by the Rulers of Bahrein to the Government of the Shah can be
regarded as establishing the validity of Persia’s claim. They have always been
well aware that the unfortunate rulers of the islands, surrounded by warlike and
more powerful States which menaced their independence, professed on various
occasions during the first sixty or seventy years of the 19th century an unwilling
allegiance to Muscat, to Persia, to Turkey, to the rulers of the mainland of
Arabia, even to Egypt—to any Power, in short, who would agree to offer them
protection and seemed at the time in a strong enough position to do so; and
that at different times for short periods they paid tribute to Muscat, Egypt, or
the Wahabi Arabs of the mainland. Any argument based on payment of tribute
would, therefore, be available in support of a claim to sovereignty over Bahrein
by any of the States to which tribute was, in fact, paid, and, in any case, it is
evident that this timid and vacillating policy pursued on occasion by his
predecessors cannot be held to affect the position of the present sheikh, who is
firm in his determination to resist the Persian Government’s claims, and has
empowered His Majesty’s Government to refute them on his behalf, in virtue of
the treaties which give them the right of defending Bahrein from external
aggression.
9. In view of the fact that the Persian Government do not base any part
of their claim on the alleged recognition of that claim by His Majesty s
Government in the past, it seems unnecessary here to reply in detail to the
various arguments by which the Persian Government endeavour to show that
their claims have received British recognition in the past. I have already, in
my note of the 18th January, 1928, explained that it has never on any occasion
been the intention of His Majesty’s Government to admit the validity of Persia s
claims, and I must now ask the Persian Government to believe that a further
full and careful examination of the contemporary records confirms that statement
in its entirety. Ever since the year 1820, when His Majesty s Government hist
entered into special treaty relations with the Sheikh of Bahrein without any
reference to the Government of the Shah, they have acted on Ike assumption
that the sheikh is an independent ruler. In 1822, when Captain William Bruce
was recalled for having negotiated the terms of an agreement with the
Prince Governor of Shiraz without their authority, the main reason recorder
for his recall and for the prompt disavowal of tills tentative agreement is that
“ it acknowledges the King of Persia’s title to Bahrein, of which there io not
the least proof.” No clearer statement could possibly have been made of the
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