"ملف ٦٣/٨ شؤون دولة مسقط: قبيلة الشحوح" [و‎‎٢‎٣] (٥٦/٤٥)

A summing up.
I. The resistance by the aheilch to survey party activities
and the attempt to oust Muscat Authority are interrelated
incidents.
II. A natural impulse of this fanatical tribe jealous to
i
preserve its soil xmia unmolested by infidels was a revenge
itself on the Muscat government that had dared to aid and
abet.
III. Up to this time tne Muscat connection was obviously
not Irksome, .ay it the Shihuh profiled nothing, suffered
no tiling, feared nothnmg. In fact they claimed to cherish
a sentiment for Muscat, hevulsion of feeling is the outcome
of the imagined disservice of Muscat to ahihuh interests.
IV. The shihuh, close neighbours of Has al Ahaima and
eye witnesses of the latter's attitude towards h.A.j. - a
position not improbably magnified in the tribal mind to
defiance of British interests with impunity, have been
emboldened to emulate example.
v. Sheikh nassan of Ahasab could not have taken up the
uncompromising line he did without assurance of the sworn
backing of his rival Sheikh Saiah of Diba and his Aumzari
allies.
VI. Sheikh nasan 1 s acquiescence to survey rarty's
design in the first place would seen to have a blind,
followed as it was by an immediate volte face. The
equivocation that followed was apparently designed to gam
time in order to canvass support for a united resistance.
VII. There was a close pact ( made between 30th January and
3rd February) throughtout between the sheikhs of Ahasab and
Diba and 3 of the 4 sheikhs of Aumzara. The one Aumzari
Sueiich who appears to have remained loyal to authority was
Muhammad bin Ali al Mahdi. This presumption needs testing
by reference to the signatories of their letter addressed to
the Sheikh of Bakha ( it is understood that
a copy was