ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ١ "انتفاضة عربية - تقارير" [و‎‎٣‎٢‎٠] (٤٩٤/١٨٧)

SECRET.
3 apJ
i
Reprinted for Reference onhj.
A R A B I A I X A S I A.
(No. XVIIIa.)
Week ending, 5tli June 1916.
Part I.
SHE RIF OF MECCA.
Arabian events liave, on the whole, been moving steadily on favourable
lines, but a critical stage has now been reached.
The Sherifs determination appears to have survived both the fall of Kut
and the letter from the British Government sent on 8th May (in which it
was made clear by implication that Great Britain could not fall in with his
Syrian project).
The gist of the letter of the 8th May was as follows :—
“ The supplies and arms promised in the last letter are at Port Soudan,
and the blockade has been ordered.
“ If your complaints of the behaviour of Russian troops in Kurdish
districts are justified, the people who have committed such crimes
must be local irregulars, fired by a spirit of revenge for the horrible
atrocities inflicted, by Turks and Kurds on Armenians; it is
impossible to think that the Russian Government approves of any
such conduct. Your complaints have been communicated to the
British Government.
“ We have received information that the Russians have no designs upon
Arab territory.
“ Concentration of forces is better than division. Therefore the British
Government advises you to withdraw Feisal from Syria and confine
your operations to Hejaz and the South for the present.
“ The Turks have abandoned their plan of attacking Egypt, and the
enemy are being steadily driven from Sinai.
“ The attitude of Nuri Es Shaalan and other Anazeh chiefs gives the
British Government keen satisfaction.
“ The British Government assures you that it will give you the utmost
possible further assistance as soon as you have definitely raised the
standard of revolt.”
Another letter to the same effect but with a clearer warning that British
co-operation in Syria was improbable was sent on the 22nd May.
The Sherifs confidence in Great Britain, however, does not seem to have
been shaken, either by Kut or by these letters. In fact, all the latest
information points in the other direction, and he appears anxious to lose no
time in starting the revolt. Cairo received independent evidence towards
the end of May that both he and his son had been organizing the Harb tribe
against Turkey.
Many causes may contribute to the consistency of his attitude: the
energy and ambition of his sons ; his fear (which he expressed recently to
Cairo) that the Turks in Syria have discovered his plans, which may have
made him believe that he has forfeited Turkish confidence in any event; and,
probably more than all, the results of the blockade, which, from a letter
dated 18th May, are proved to have been immediate and considerable.
The “ strict patrol ” (a term substituted for the original name “ blockade ”
to which there were political objections) came into full force on the 15th May.
Preparatory measures had been taken before that date. Dhows on the sea
had" been turned back with warnings ; sailings of dhows from Egypt and the
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