ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ١ "انتفاضة عربية - تقارير" [ظ‎‎٢‎٩‎٥] (٤٩٤/١٣٨)

From Viceroy, 13th June 1916.
“ (Repeated to Cairo.)
Secret. Arab revolt. We are greatly disturbed by report of British naval activity off
Jeddah, ;md in view of effect announcement would have on JMohammedan opinion, we trust all
news of it will be carefully suppressed. Priinu facie it appears very difficult to reconcile
action taken with the pledge formally given by Allied Powers, and we wish to enter most
emphatic caveat against any measure violating spirit of that pledge.”
(B) Suggested Separation of and Propaganda amongst the Arab Prisoners
in India.
“ From Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, 17th June 1916.
;£ (Addressed to High Commissioner, Cairo ; repeated to Secretary of State for India.)
“ Reference to telegrams from Officer in Charge, Intelligence, Cairo, to Commander-in-Chief,
Simla, No. I.G. 679, dated 12th June, and LG. 700, dated loth June, asking us to despatch
to Egypt by next transport certain Arab officers and selected Arab artillery men, prisoners of
war, and to convey message from Faruki and El Massi to various other prisoners of war in
India. Preliminary action is being taken here, but I should be glad to know whether these
proposals have the approval of His Majesty’s Government and yourself. Further communi
cations of this nature should be addressed by you to nle in Foreign Department.”
((7) Attitude of the Lleneral Officer Commanding, Force “ to the
Arab Bureau.
From General Lake, 11th June 1916.
“ 2758. (1) The first mention of Bureau on my record occurs in Secretary of State’s
telegram of 10th December 1915 to the Viceroy, and I am not aware on what the statement
that suggestion came from General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, is based.
(“) i he Secretary of. State s present telegram as repeated by you does not furnish a
complete reply to my specific query as to whether words 1 policy and principles’ in his
telegram of 30th April merely refer to working of Bureau or to national policy with regard
to the Arab question.
‘ (3) in the first alternative 1 shall necessarily use my discretion as to what is or is not
published or disseminated in occupied territory here.
” 111 (i| L' second alternative l find it difficult to accept position implied without full
discussion.
(-1) If must be lemembered, as they are themselves, 1 think, now realising, that the
environment and point of view of Cairo differ widely in many respects from ours in Irak.
Certainly, hitherto the experiment made in attempting to handle affairs of Irak through
Cairo without previously consulting us can hardly be regarded as fortunate. J refer to
original communications with .Sheri 1 in regard to Mesopotamia and the Arab kingdom; the
decision to send A1 Misri and Farokhi and certain Arab officers to Basra; and another
abortive project connected with Saiyid Talib.
“ (5) l)ur i ill F ihe P a6t fevv weeks the experience gained by one or two officers from Cairo
who have paid visits here has, I hope, resulted in a considerable removal of wroim impressions
and the readjustment of Cairo's views in several respects, but 1 feel strongly" that if His
Majesty’s Government contemplate reaching decision in regard to questions of policy affectino-
Mesopotamia without consulting us here, and if they also propose to communicate these
decisions through Cairo, the position is not one which I or my chief Political officer should be
asked to accept.
‘‘ ( , 6) lam not aware if any definite decision has been reached as to lines on which our policy
and plans m regard to future Arabia and Irak are to be based, if so I have not been informed
ot same.
™ntm- u to represent that no Bencral ,,ul,cy in repmlt,. problems
formulnled vitl.out (he vmivs of imlm, Forsum Gulf, Mesopotamia. Aden, ilm | Gairobeino
severally ami speed,eally represented at a conference assembled for the purpose would be in
the least likely to pr,,Te workable or aeh.ere finality I would accordin K ly urge the assembly
of such a, conference with the least possible delay. I f presided over by a high officer of State
commanding general con ,donee .t should have a good prospect of reaching common ground
and devising a workable basis for a national policy.
The Shenf of Mecca and the French Government.
A proposal was recently made by the French Government that they shoult
lot ^ 11 liiluio pav half ol any grants made to the Sherif
The obvious objections to this may be overcome by a suggestion, It
winch M. 1 iwt has agreed that ,£ the Sherif achieves any marked success
the 1 renen Government shall send him through the British Government “-r
intermediaries (according to the letter of the notes exchanged), a sum o
money with a statement of their appreciation of his action,