ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ١ "انتفاضة عربية - تقارير" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٣] (٤٩٤/١٣٣)

.:-r‘a»w
SECRET.
To be Read.
APPRECIATION OF THE ATTACHED ARAB REPORT.
The situation has now developed into certainty. The Sherif has burnt
his boats, and must stand or lall by what he has done.
So Lu his operations seem to have met with considerable success.
The railway West of Medina has been cut * Mecca, Taif and Jedda
have fallen.
The main question is whether he will be able to capture Medina before
the Turks can relieve it.
At present it is urgent that the Sherif should be given all possible
assistance in munitions, food, and money to enable him to make headway
during the hot months of -1 uly and August, during which time the Arabs
have a greater power of action than the Turks.
1 he Sherif’s action will probably bring Idris of Asir in with some
enthusiasm, and with careful management influence the Imam of Yemen.
1 he question of introducing the French Government (see page of
Report) to the Sherif is a matter which will require action within the
next fortnight.
As regards military operations the Sherif’s position may become, critical
in September, when the weather improves and a release of Turkish troops
in Armenia may be anticipated.
The information regarding Ibn Rashid is somewhat regrettable.
Ibn Rashid may be yet won over to our side. In any case politically it
would be preferable that he should be dealt with by the Koweit Arabs
rather than by us. His force of 600 men is not of much account unless
it be the advance guard of a Turkish expedition. If it is, and the Turks
push down a large force, it is the Turks that matter and not Ibn Rashid.
The consequence of a Turkish counter-stroke in Mesopotamia along the
Euphrates culminating in a second battle of Shaiba might be very serious
as it menaces our base.
The situation at Aden remains unchanged, but it will be noticed that
events in Ilejaz have for the present isolated the Turkish Yemen command
from any possible communication with Syria, and that the 1,400 Turks
and 20 guns outside Aden, where they are facing 3,000 British troops with
18 guns, are morally in a worse position than they were. The fact that
with the help of II.M.S. Fox and liar ding e the Sherd’s levies have obliged
1,400 Turks to surrender may, however, provoke odious comparisons with
our passivity at Aden.
The co-operation of the Indian Government with that of Egypt seems
to lack enthusiasm, and Indian political internal policy to act as a drag oi
S 311