ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٣] (٤٥٠/٤٠٣)

of the British Government; secondly, that they did not want us to know too much of
what was going on on shore. I am certain that the Sherif intended no discourtesy. I
was the more surprised at the suspicion and distrust shewn by Faroki on these two
occasions as on all others he has been perfectly frank and friendly.
Colonel Wilson, Captain Warren, Faroki, and myself, went ashore early on the
2nd July, and proceeded straight to Sherif Mohsin’s house. The police, with whom
Faroki had threatened us, were so far absent that we could not find one to show us the
way. We found Sherif Mohsin better, but hardly able to stand. He had asked for
the ship’s doctor the previous day, but as Faroki had objected, saying that tho Sherif’s
own physician was attending him, we had not pressed the point. It subsequently
came to light that Sherif Mohsin is in great dread of being poisoned by this physician,
and so was not very appreciative of the Sherif’s care of his health. Our visit only
lasted a few minutes, and after failing to get any reply to our telephone calls downstairs,
we went round to the exchange. After waiting nearly an hour the Sherif came to the
telephone; the matter was explained to him by Faroki, and he at once said that
everything should be landed at Jeddah. Disembarkation accordingly began the same
afternoon.
While we were waiting the following telegram came for me from him :—
“ To the Honourable Captain Cornwallis,
“ Representative of his Excellency the High
“ Commissioner on board the man-of-war off Jeddah.
“ As soon as you receive this please forward it by wireless to his Excellency in
Egypt. Said Bey has arrived Mecca with two mountain guns and has been making
difficulties. He asked for an ambulance and an armourer for the two guns which
we gave him in order to simplify matters. He is now making further difficulties
which will not be to the good of the common cause. I beg that you will either
send two aeroplanes as soon as possible to destroy the fort at Taif, which is about
150 kilometres from Jeddah, or order Said Bey to go to Taif, or send two quick
firing guns of the latest pattern in addition to any asked for before. Please
arrange one of the above alternatives as soon as possible. I beg you to reply. I
urgently request you to give orders to whom it may concern to prevent the officers
with the guns going to Medina from acting in the same way.
“ Sherif and Emir of Mecca, Hussein.
“July 2, 1916.”
About half an hour after the receipt of this, a message came through to cancel it.
Evidently Said Bey had been asked to do something which was impossible from a
military point of view and had refused. The employment of Egyptian troops in the j
Hejaz is unpopular both with the Arabs and the Egyptians themselves. On leaving j]
the landing-stage ou the way back I was handed two letters for the High Commissioner
and one addressed to myself (Appendix VII). The latter contained a request for 250
tents, and stated that the monthly requirements starting from the 1st July would be
50,000 okes of flour, 70,000 okes of rice, 2,000 okes of coffee, and 2,000 okes of sugar;
three quarters to be landed at Rabigh and one quarter at Jeddah. As the Sherif is
reckoning to feed not only his army, but also the indigent civil population it appears
probable that the above is underestimated and that a further demand till be received
shortly. Faroki also informed me that the Sherif wished three quarters of the supplies
still due to be landed at Rabigh and one quarter at Jeddah, and that he was very
anxious for two ships to be detailed permanently for his requirements. The Sherif also
wants a sea-going yacht manned by Mohammedans, a request which I did not think
necessary to forward by telegraph.
About sunset, Faroki brought a letter from the Sherif saying that he had heard
from Sheikh Hussein Mabeiriq that the ships had arrived and that everything was being
taken off. At the same time the ships themselves arrived back at Jeddah.
Early on the 3rd July Faroki came to me to say that he had had a message from
the Sherif that he very urgently wanted 1,000 rifles, with 1,000 rounds per rifle, at
Rabigh. It appears that the Medina garrison, which numbers about 7,000 men, made a
sortie from the town and inflicted heavy losses on the Arabs. As Faroki says that the
Arabs only number 9,000 men, Medina cannot be seriously besieged. The Sherif also
sent a message complaining once more of the Japanese riflles, and requesting that
an officer should be appointed to see that only articles of good quality were sent,
to him.