ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٩] (٤٥٠/٢٧٦)

accepted, the troops should be sent without delay. He therefore asked that, subject to
the approval of the consul, a brigade ol infantry, two batteries of artillery, a company
of eno-ineers, a field ambulance, and half the Sirdar’s aeroplanes should be held in
readiness to proceed to Rabegh at the earliest possible date. If available, Moslem troops
would be preferable, though this is of less importance, as European officers ancj^
mechanic troops would be necessary for any such force. .
Sir H. McMahon says that he knows that if we do not send the troops the French
Government is ready to offer to send Moslem troops to Hejaz. He greatly deprecates
this, as it would rob us of the very great political advantages which the Sherif s success
will give us. Moreover, in his opinion, the French troops could hardly reach Hejaz in
time to be of use.
He then said that since writing the above the Sherif had telegraphed to him
urgently asking for three battalions.
In conclusion, he asked the G.O.C.I.C. to submit the question to the War Office,
with such observations as he might see fit to make.
Sir H. McMahon further said that there was every hope that the Arabs would, by
their own efforts, attain the desired success, but it seemed to be imperatively necessary
to provide moral support to ensure this. As to French troops being sent, he greatly
doubted whether they would be in time to be of use ; but in any case such assistance
would entail many inconvenient consequences.
To this the Foreign Office replied, on the 14th September [No. 744], that the War
Committee had, on the 2nd September, considered the proposal to send Sudanese troops
to Hejaz, and were decidedly of opinion that British troops could not be spared from
Egypt to replace them. This would equally apply to sending British troops to Hejaz.
No hopes of overcoming the objections of the military authorities could be held out,
and, that being so, we must facilitate any assistance which the French may be able
to send.
Help for the Sherif.
On the 7th September the French Ambassador informed the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs that his Government was willing to help the Sherif, and that Colonel
Bremond had precise instructions to come to an understanding with the British
authorities in Cairo in regard to this matter, and to give all possible help to the new
Government without interfering in any way either with the administration of the
country, the complete independence of which the English and French Governments are,
by their recent agreements, mutually pledged to respect, or with questions which
concern the political status of the Red Sea littoral. [F.O. 178,497.]
On the 12th September the Admiralty informed the Foreign Office that it
concurred in informing the Sherif that His Majesty’s Government was prepared “ to
afford him such naval support as may be practicable in the Red Sea or Gulf of Akaba,
with due regard to other operations.” | F.O. 181,689.] This was telegraphed to Sir H.
McMahon on the 14th September [No. 737].
French Mission to the Sherif,
Sir H. McMahon telegraphed on the 15th September [No. 785] that he had been
informed by the French Minister that the Civil and Military Mission would leave Suez
on the 17th September for Jeddah, whence the Moslem members would proceed to
Mecca. He added that Colonel Bremond and the other French officers appeared to be
intending to remain at Jeddah for a considerable time.
New Turkish Force for Hejaz.
An agent reported on the 14th September that a force of 9,000 men was being
sent against the Sherif, under the command of Fuad Pasha. He said that the lines of
communication were very bad, and that the expedition need not be seriously feared.
IBN SAUD.
Sir H. McMahon telegraphed on the 13th September [No. 779], with reference to
the telegram of the 8th September from Basra to the Secretary of State for India, that
there was nothing in the negotiations between [group omitted] and the Sherif which
was incompatible with [? our] undertakings in regard to Ibn Saud, and in consequence