ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٤] (٤٥٠/٢٤٦)

8
Baghdad on the 26th February, 1916, and stayed there twelve days. The division to
which the battalion belonged had gone to join the force at Kut, but the battalion was
detached and sent to Kasr-es- Shirin.
The situation at Baghdad was that there were neither horses or vehicles of any
kind, that the population was almost denuded of men, most of whom were known 0
have perished in the Caucasus, that there was an absolute crisis over the Turkish paper
money, which could hardly he made to pass, ihe remnants of the population hoped
for a British victory and occupation, but were helpless. Numbers of troops from
Baghdad deserted, and took refuge at Kerbela, where they formed a sort of republic,
killing the Turkish Government officials. Indeed, to the assistance of these deserters
with their arms and munitions, the officers consider must be attributed the real cause of
the Turkish abandonment of Kerbela.
The battalion left for Kasf-es-Shirin about the 7th March, proceeding along the
following route : Khanat Ibn Said, Barcuba Khan, Abu Jezr, Sharriban, Khusabad,
Khanikin, Kasr-es-Shirim
The march was through safe calm country, well affected to the iurks. At Kasr-
es-Shirin were gathered about 10,000 armed irregulars in German pay, recruited from
Persia, officered by Persian gendarmes. These men seemed quite worthless, deserted
freely, and were very unready to fight. The battalion was detailed as guard for
Colonel Bop, the chief German officer in charge of operations at Kasr-es-Shirin, and
performed this duty for four weeks. At Kasr-es-Shirin the officers came in^ contact
practically for the first time with the Germans since leaving Constantinople. Hitherto
they had hardly met a German, though it was a matter of common knowledge that
most staff moves and political measures, such as the extermination of Armenians, were
due to German advice or pressure.
At Kasr-es-Shirin there were about eleven German and Austrian officers with an
equal number of orderlies, mostly Austrian. The relations between the German and
Turkish officers were extremely bad. The origin of the ill-feeling had arisen through
friction between the well-known Turkish naval officer, Rauf Bey (ex-commander of the
“ Hamideh ”), and Colonel Bop. Rauf Bey had been entrusted with an expedition of
desperadoes, 600 in number, who were to force their way to Afghanistan and work up
a Jehad. Rauf Bey had desired to follow a violent policy of terrorism in Persia, the
German agents had objected on the ground that such action would set the population
against them, and imperil isolated operators like Wassinuss. Matters reached a crisis
in February when Fausi Bey was appointed to conduct an enquiry, he reported that,
from a military point of view, Rauf was in the right, and that from a political point of
view Bop was right. Rauf retired to Constantinople and Bop remained, and the
friction increased. It was also stated that the Germans had desired to send an
Austrian or German division to Persia, that the Ottoman Government had objected on
the score that this would render the Jehad propaganda nugatory, and had arranged
for a Turkish division to proceed to Kasr-es-Shirin, allowing it to be supplied and
controlled by Bop and Yon Lebben. The battalion of the two officers making this
report was a part of a mixed force carrying out this part of the Turkish bargain. Ihe
Turks and Germans were not on speaking terms, one of them even coming to blows
with Junior Captain Shurbaji, who reported the matter, and was acclaimed by his
commander and the other Turkish officers.
After four weeks the battalion returned to Baghdad, ten days being occupied in
the journey owing to the overflowing of the “ Diala ” and the opening of the Barcuba
pontoon bridge. The battalion left Baghdad on the 15th April and reached Kut on the
16th, arriving in the middle of the fighting, which continued for eight days. In the
opinion of the officers Kut was almost relieved, and would have been had the garrison
been able to make any effort to support the relieving force. The officers state that the
Turks under-estimated the garrison, and that the garrison over-estimated the Turks,
4,000 men was the total number used to contain Kut. The officers also state that it
was the general impression among the Turks that the Indian soldiers were badly
trained, but that the British were extremely tenacious and plucky. W hen Kut
surrendered, there were two matters of general comment; (1) the large numbers of the
garrison, and (2) the completeness with which they had destroyed their weapons, stores,
and munitions. Hardly a rifle or a cartridge was to be found. The British artillery
was good, and the British infantry remarkable for their expenditure of ammunition in
night firing. After the surrender of Kut nine Arab notables were hanged ; this piece
of cruelty was to show that the British were either unable or unwilling to guard their
friends. After the fall of Kut the hostilities w T ere confined to the British wasting
ammunition. After three weeks’ stay the battalion returned to Khanikin, taking