ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎١‎١‎٥] (٤٥٠/٢٢٧)

SECRET.
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For Reference only.
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ARABIAN REPORT.
N.S. No. XII. October 4, 1916 (night).
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PART 1.
The Sherif of Mecca.
The Consequences of Failure.
The Sherif s Operations.
The Haj. ^
The Arab Prisoners.
Opinion in Afghanistan.
1. Kabul.
2. Kandahar.
Ibn Sand.
Koweyt and the Trucial Coast.
Bahrein.
Maskat.
Contents.
PART II.
Political Events in the Fields of Operations.
Aden.
The Caucasus.
PART III.
Miscellaneous.
Turkish Propaganda.
Report on the Revolt by a Diplomat in Constantinople.
Plot against Enver Pasha.
APPENDIX.
Miscellaneous Cuttings from the Press.
Enemy Propaganda in England.
Mesopotamia.
PART I. .
THE SHERIF OF MECCA.
*>
The Consequences of Failure.
THE War Council having asked what would be the effect on the Moslem world of
a collapse of the Sherif’s revolt, Sir H. McMahon, on the 29th September, telegraphed
[No. 824] the opinions of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt and himself.
The Commander-in-Chief said that he was not in a position to speak authorita
tively. Such a collapse “ might have as little effect as the evacuation of Gallipoli or
the surrender of Kut.” Rut, if there should be an upheaval, he anticipated that it
would be of a formidable nature; and if experts think that such an upheaval is likely,
then the forces in Egypt ought to be reinforced by three divisions at least.
Sir H. McMahon expressed the opinion that the collapse of the Sherif would have
a great effect throughout the whole Moslem world, varying, however, in importance in
different countries. It would do away with the present effective barrier against Teuto-
Turkish designs and would afford the enemy the base necessary for military and political
activity on the lines of the Stotzingen mission in Yemen, the Red Sea littoral,
Abyssinia, Somaliland, and the Sudan. It would endanger Idrisi and Ibn Saud, and so
add to our difficulties in Aden and Mesopotamia.
As each one of the political results mentioned would involve demands for additional
troops elsewhere, the supply of which might primarily fall on Egypt, the Commander-
in-Chief’s estimate of three divisions might prove to be too moderate. The Sirdar says
that, for the Sudan alone, probably two additional brigades of British troops would be
required, solely for defensive measures, on his frontier.
Sir H. McMahon adds that fortunately the trend of recent events gives every
reason for hoping that the present discussion is of a purely academic nature more
especially so if a force is held ready in Egypt for the rapid effective defence of Rabegh
if the necessity for such defence should arise. On that point he was sending a separate
communication.
The result of failure was also dealt with in a report made to the Sirdar by one of
his secretaries, Ibrahim Bey Dimitri, a Syrian, who accompanied Colonel Wilson to
[898—11] B