ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٨] (٤٥٠/٢١٣)

SECRET.
i
For Eeference only.
ARABIAN REPORT.
N.S. No. XIV. October 15, 1916 (night).
no
* t-u
PARI' 1.
The Sherif of Mecca.
Control of Hejaz arrang’ements.
The defence of Rabegh.
The Sherifs Operations.
French troops for the Sherif.
Maskat.
Koweyt and the Trucial Coast.'
Bahrein.
Contents.
PART II.
j Political Notes from the Fields of Operations.
Aden.
The Caucasus.
PART TIL
Miscellaneous.
Rechid Bey on the Situation in Turkey.
German Views in regard to the Balkans.
APPENDIX.
Committee of Union and Progress.
PART 1.
THE SHERIF OF MECCA.
Control of Hejaz Arrangements.
On the 3rd October the Foreign Office telegraphed to Sir H. McMahon [No. 787]
that the War Committee had had under its consideration the question of the military-
control and supervision of all arrangements for assisting the Sherif in Hejaz, and that
it had decided that this control and supervision should be entrusted to the Sirdar, who
should be instructed to do what was necessary, keeping himself in close communication
and co-operation with the commander of the naval forces in the Red Sea. The
Commander-in-Chief in Egypt would be notified of this by the War Office, and he
would be instructed to help (so far as his own requirements would permit) in the
provision of stores and supplies. *
Sir H. McMahon acknowledged the receipt of this telegram on the following day
[No. 844] and said that he much regretted the decision arrived at for the reason that
the arrangement which was proposed had already been given a full trial and had been
found to be impracticable. The Sirdar undertook control, at Sir H. McMahon’s request,
last June and after some weeks the arrangement had to be abandoned, as it led to
overlapping, confusion, and endless correspondence without any compensating advantage.
The centre of military intelligence, the Arab Bureau, and (in case of purchase of
stores, &c.) financial control were all in Egypt; the naval Commander-in-Chief was in
close touch with Cairo and could not possibly he so with the Sirdar at Khartum.
Moreover, the naval arrangements in the Red Sea must conform to the requirements of
military operations in or from Egypt. Further, the entrance of French military
elements on the scene made it desirable that Cairo and not Khartum should be the
centre of military control. The military and political aspects of the question were so
intermixed that facilities for rapid personal exchange of views between those responsible
was necessary. Sir H. McMahon trusted that 'the decision arrived at might be
reconsidered or at least held in abeyance till the Sirdar could express an opinion.
On the 9th October Sir H. McMahon telegraphed again [No. 871] suggesting, as
a solution of the control problem, the sending of a military mission to Jeddah, whose
business should be to give well-reasoned and mature advice on the military problems of
the situation as they arose. The idea of such a mission wasjfavoured by the Commander-
in-Chief in Egypt. Sir H. McMahon suggested, as being suitable for the work, Colonel
[898—13]