ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٤٥٠/٢٠٠)

my position and circumstances vis-d-vis the Sherif, and also regarding the questions
which affect you in this connection. I feel it incumbent on me to state to you (though
you are much better informed in regard to the affair than I am) that my fear is that
the Sherif may obtain from the British Government an undertaking for his independent
control over Hejaz and the Arabs. Although you yourself 'probably appreciate my
fears, it' is possible that the representative of the British Governme nt, who is actually
conducting negotiations with the Sherif, is not acquainted with the position.
The telegram exhibits the result of the inevitable partizanship which arises when two
independent authorities negotiate with and support rival chiefs. Study of Ibn Saud’s
letter shows how an Arab chief attempts to set one English officer against another.
In the case of Idris and the Sherif, the authorities of Egypt and Aden have
become practically two parties, one backing one and one the other, and between the two
there is little or no co-operation as the last line of the telegram shows. There can be
only one of two remedies for this, and that is to put Aden under Egypt, or both under
one authority. As much may be said in the case of Ibn Saud and the Sherif, though
matters have not got so far advanced for geographical reasons, but the same forces are
at work.
The following is an attempt to analyse the root cause of the evil. No people
have a greater natural aptitude for playing off persons and departments one against the
other than Arabs. Political manipulation in town or desert is an inherent talent in all
people of Arab stock. The Arabs can play English against French, Turk against
German, Young Turk against Old, or Anglo-Indian against Anglo-Egyptian.
The Arabs have charm, tact, and a deep insight into the relationships and
weaknesses of men. It is instinctive in an Arab to seek a patron, and then work his
patron against the patron of an enemy, our system of divided control is an incentive
to this vicious tendency. Ibn Saud and Idris both realise quite plainly how the land
lies, and make all they can out of the situation. The relations of London, Simla,
Basra, and Cairo are perhaps clearer to these untutored desert folk than to British
officers themselves. Consequently Ibn Saud rejoices in the Sherifs success, but
tempers his satisfaction with the regret that probably the British in Egypt are not as
wise as those of the Gulf. Idris adopts the attitude of sorrow rather than anger, and
is in the running for a knighthood. Comfida falls and the authorities at Aden take
no action as it has ceased to be in their sphere. So long as we continue to conduct
our policy on the basis of divided control this state of affairs will go from bad to
worse. A natural Arab tendency to divisions and feuds is increased by our own
divisions, and our natural British tendency to team rivalry is increased by the artful
tricks of the Arab notables. Both evils feed on each other. It is impossible to hope
for a united Arabia until our Arabian policy is under one firm hand. Once Arabs
know they are up against a single and undivided force they are extremely accom
modating, but so long as there is a chance of setting people by the ears they will
indulge in the exciting sport of promoting rivalry.
In peace time this is a matter of little consequence, but in war concentration and
unity of purpose are both vital. The Arab movement may or may not have much in
it, but it is* bad policy to let a great potential asset fritter away merely because the
Indian Government was established before the Suez Canal. Single control could beset
up without moving any member of the personnel.
M. S.