ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٩‎٩] (٤٥٠/١٩٥)

Wilson Pasha to the Sherif.
His Highness the Sherif and Emir of Mecca. September 2, 1916.
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Highness’s telegram of
r^terday, by which I am delighted to see that your Highness has issued orders
tor two mule guns and two Maxim guns to be sent here from Taif at once, and that
they will arrive in about ten days’ time. I am sure this is the best course to follow,
and they will be of the greatest possible use to your son Faisal Bey.
When the two guns arrive from Suez I will send Bimb. Zeki Eff. with them, and
one howitzer from here to Babegh, as soon as there is a ship to take them.
Zeki Efl*. wishes to train twenty-five Arabs for artillery work, and I understand
that your Highness is giving orders for these men to be supplied and go with Zeki Eff.
Your Highness requires artillerymen, and this is the way to get them.
I do not understand your Highness’s reference in your telegram where }mu state
that I refused to separate the guns and send some to Medina and some to Taif;
possibly there is a mistake in the transmission. As your Highness will no doubt
remember I stated on my arrival that I could not arrange for the batteries to be divided
until the arrival of Said Bey Ali, their commandant. When he arrived, he did not
want to separate the batteries if possible, but when your Highness stated that you
particularly wished two gtms to go to Taif and four to Medina I agreed that the four
guns and the whole Maxim battery did go to Babegh, but were not allowed to land by
Shaykh Hussein’s people ; they therefore returned and joined Said Bey at Mecca.
I expect your Highness will also remember that more than once you asked me to
return the Maxim battery to Port Sudan, as you did not require it; finally it remained,
and has, I understand, been useful at Taif, and will be more than useful to Faisal Bey.
Please accept my best salaams, and I beg to inform your Highness that I leave
to-morrow and am going to Suez, where you may be sure I shall do all I can in the
interests of your Highness’s cause.
WILSON PASHA.
APPENDIX (C).
Miscellaneous Cuttings from the Press.
Italy arid Asia Minor.
THE “ IdeaNazionale” (13th October), in another leading article on “ The Oversea
Bights of Italy,” congratulates itself on having secured the support of “ the best part of
the country ” to its programme of “ compensations in Asia Minor.”
But Franchetti, in the “ Corriere della Sera,” while agreeing in the main with the
“ Idea’s ” desire to see the Ethiopian zone reserved to Italian influence, passes over
certain elements necessary to the attainment of that object. Italian influence cannot
be paramount so long as other Powers retain control of the traditional caravan route of
Zeila, the southern confines of Abyssinia, the coast of Yemen facing Erythrea, and still
more the valley of the Suba with the only waterway and the only port commanding the
trade of the lower regions of Ethiopia.
But still more grave is the seeming acceptance both by Franchetti and by Giuseppe
Piazza in the “ Tribuna,” of England’s prescriptive right to the Gulf of Alexandretta.^
The “ Idea” has already explained that the only terms on which Italy could waive
her claim to this most important access to one of the great arteries of international
trade would be the acquisition in compensation of all Southern and Central Anatolia
“ as far as the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora, including the
whole development of the railway from the coast as far as west of Sivas.”
According to Franchetti and Piazza England’s claim to the Gulf of Alexandretta
rests on its possession of Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and India. ^ As well say that
because France and England are going to own three-quarters of Africa, it is logical that
they should have the fourth quarter ! . . .
Alexandretta is even more important for the development of Anatolia than it is lor
that of Mesopotamia, and, though we may waive our claims in favour of England, it
would be a mistake to recognise any prescriptive right on the part of England.