ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٩‎٤] (٤٥٠/١٨٦)

for them to use had been sent back by the Sherii from Jeddah : that sixty odd boxes
of bombs had been on board a warship for weeks, as the Sherif said he did not want
them landed. I told them all this, thinking it as well for Faisal to know that all the
blame tor the shortage of munitions did not lie at the door of the British Government.
Faisal went as near cursing his saintly father as I suppose a son of a Grand Sherif
could, and added : “ My father tries to do everything, but is not a soldier.” Having
had a month’s experience of the old gentleman I was able to agree cordially.
Faisal stated that he considered his position most critical, and that he dare not
return to his troops until he could tell them help was coming ; I do not know if I
succeeded in persuading him to give up this absurd attitude, but I did my best.
He said that he had suggested to the Sherif that he and his force should leave the
Medina district and go to Mecca in readiness to defend it.
On being told that the Sherif objected to British officers coming with Egyptian
troops unless dressed as Arabs, he swore and assured me that if British troops landed
and put on Arab cloaks he would them [sic] to discard them, as what he wanted was to
show the Arabs that Great Britain was really helping, which knowledge would do an
enormous amount to buck up the Arabs, and would make “ fence-sitter^ ” get down on
the Sherif’s side. All Arabs loathe the Turks, and have the greatest opinion of the
might of Great Britain.
He formulated his urgent requests as follows :—
1. Three thousand trained troops to represent Great Britain, even
at Yambo or Rabegh.
2. Aeroplanes.
3. Permanent cutting of the railway, which would bring in the
and have the greatest effect.
4. Mountain- and machine-guns.
5. Rifles.
Re 1.—
As I telegraphed yesterday the Sherif will only sanction about 300 British troops,
who would ostensibly be an escort to the aeroplanes ; if half a battalion could be
spaied and stationed at Yambo or Rabegh it would have a good effect. At the former
place there is a condenser which requires coal, but at the latter place I have no personal
knowledge of the water supply. I shall be in a better position to judge after visiting
Rabegh ; but at present I am inclined to think that—providing the water supply can
be arranged—Rabegh will be the best place for ths aeroplane depbt and for any troops
which may be sent. This would give Faisal a position to fall back upon if the worst
happens ; he would also probably have the support of the guns of some patrol ships.
Re 2.—
I have sent Faisal a letter telling him that aeroplanes are coming, which is
excellent news; I have also informed the Sherif, who expressed his gratitude.
Re 3.—
X quite appreciate the difficulties of the Oommander-in-Chief fArbur’s telenram
No. 1.296, dated 30th August).
My point is that, in my opinion, the 'permanent cutting of the Hedjaz railway, so
as to prevent the despatch of any reinforcements, is (especially now that aeroplanes,
guns, and machine guns are coming) the most urgent and important operation necessary
at the present moment; whether my various recommendations are possible or not to
carry out I have no means of knowing at the time they are made, but I assume it to
be my duty to make such as I consider necessary.
If the proposed operations north of Yambo turn out alright I am hoping that
operations from Akaba will start as soon as Colonel Parker returns to Suez. &
Re 4.—
Bimbasni Hassan Effendi Zeki arrived yesterday with men and mules, the two
guns are expected here about the 6th from Suez, meanwhile I am getting Zeki Effendi
on to training Arabs in artillery work.
Re 5.—
I have persuaded the Sherif to send the whole 5,000 brought by H.M.S. “ Suva ”
to Xaisal, and the ‘ Fox is, I believe, bringing the remainder, 2,500.
if they remained
Northern Tribes