ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٩‎٠] (٤٥٠/١٧٧)

was proceeding to do so that afternoon ; the Turks were rapidly forming a market
there at the expense of Comfida, and were terrorising the local tribes, who would be
forced to join them.
On the 23rd October Sir H. McMahon [No. 930] transmitted a telegram sent on
•e previous day to the Sirdar by Colonel Wilson, who said that Abdulla had
informed him : —
1. That a party ol Harb had, east of Medina, defeated a force from Ibn Hashid,
killing 15 men and capturing 25 rifles, 10 horses, and 30 camels ;
2. That a lurkish force had been destroyed near Medina by another party of
Arabs. The Salieh tribesmen captured 150 from the Turks.
The Defence of Rabegh.
On the 13th October the Secretary of State telegraphed to Sir H. McMahon
[No. 821], for the information of the Sirdar, that, after careful consideration, the War
Committee had already decided that a brigade could neither be spared for RaOegh
nor sent to the Sudan to replace one sent from there ; that the doing so was made
more than ever impossible by demands to assist Roumania ; and that the Indian
Government considered the political objections to sending British troops to Hejaz to
be most serious. He suggested that a visit to Rabegh of someone so important as
the Sirdar might create some difficulty of the same kind: a point on which he was
consulting the India Office.
On the 15th October Sir H. McMahon telegraphed [No. 901] the Sirdar’s reply.
Sir R. Wingate was of opinion that they should await a further expression of the
War Committee’s views, as they might be modified by the telegrams he had sent to
Sir H. McMahon, which he presumed had been transmitted. He definitely cancelled
his visit to Jeddah ; and if the War Committee should confirm its instructions, he would
cancel the orders for despatch of aeroplanes and the holding a brigade in readiness for
Rabegh. In this event he considered that the Sherif should be informed that British
troops could not be sent to him, and that His Majesty’s Government would raise no
objection to the landing of French troops in Hejaz.
On the 16th October Sir H. McMahon telegraphed [No. 905] that the Sirdar had
communicated to the Arab Bureau his intention to send a message to Colonel Wilson
for the information of the Sherif, subject to any observations which the High Commis
sioner might wish to make. Sir H. McMahon struck out rather more than half the
proposed telegram, which then read as follows :—
“ His Majesty’s Government, after full consideration of political and military
situation, have decided not to send a British expeditionary force to Rabegh. In
arriving at their decision, His Majesty’s Government have been particularly
influenced by necessity to refrain from any action which would be liable by [group
undecypherable] to damage prestige of Arab movement in the eyes of Moslems
outside Hejaz. Reasons which preclude despatch of British to Hejaz coast do not
appear to militate with equal force against acceptance by Sherif of Moslem Arab
contingent which has been placed at his disposal by French Government; and you
should therefore advise that, provided Sherif considers French assistance may be
useful and necessary to him, he should accept it in the same spirit as he accepted
services of Egyptian artillery and escorts. You should further impress on Sherif
Abdulla that with assistance in personnel and war materiel they are receiving,
Arab armies, although inferior with regard to artillery, should be sufficiently
numerous and formidable to prevent a successful advance by Turks from Me u in a,
and that, provided proper arrangements are made by Arabs to interfere with
Turkish commurncati'ons, reinforcement of Turkish force at Medina will prove
increasingly difficult, and ultimately it is hoped impossible, owing to British
operations now in progress north of Hejaz.”
Viscount Grey telegraphed his approval of the amended message on the 17th
October [No. 831].
On the 18th October Sir H. McMahon telegraphed [No. 911] that the Sirdar had
informed him that, as he had received no modification of the instructions sent by the
Foreign Office on the 13th October [No. 821 ], he had formally issued the instructions
to Colonel Wilson noted above as modified by the High Commissioner, and further
instructions [no copy received] regarding the return to Suez of the flight of aeroplanes.