ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٨‎١] (٤٥٠/١٥٩)

SECRET,
APPRECIATION OF ATTACHED ARABIAN REPORT
No. NYI (New Series).
THIS report contains a large amount of miscellaneous information which is difficult
to appreciate in a general way. It is therefore taken under various headings
CD *
The Rabegh Cinsrs.
The sduation at Rabegh is the most important factor in Ilejaz affairs : apparently
the Turks are making the expected advance, and we are suffering to the full from ad
the inconveniences arising from our complicated and practically unworkable system of
management as described in Report XIY (N.S).
We do not know—
1 . Where Colonel Bremond’s contingent is.
O
This is owing t > lack of liaison between French and British.
2. YThether aeroplanes have gone to Rabegh or not.
This is owing to divided control.
3. What available troops the Sirdar may have.
This is owing to the Sudan being independent of the War Office.
4. Whether the Sherif’s message in regard to his son’s victory or Aziz’s message in
regard to the danger to Rabegh is the correct one.
This is owing to lack of organised intelligence.
o o o
The only thing that can be said is that, by repeating simultaneously everybody’s
telegrams to everybody else, the best effort has been made under the circumstances to
meet the emergency which has arisen. If we get through this crisis, it will certainly be
necessary to reorganise the political and military control.
The Rabegh crisis has shown the grave dangers to which our present system
exposes us. Had we taken the matter in hand in a businesslike way in June it is
safe to say that by now we should have financed, raised, equipped, and drilled an
adequate regular force for the Sherif, and that we should be able to get an accurate
account of the situation from day to day, and have the whole Arab movement
throughout the peninsula tending to coherence. As it is, we have been drifting
along until we have come up against a very dangerous crisis, which finds us in great
disorder.
As matters now stand, the Foreign Office is the only channel for the issue of
military orders m Hejaz, which has become a field of operations. Ihis is contrary to
all sense and experience. It is urged with all seriousness and earnestness that the
moment has come to set matters right once for all in regard to Arabian policy and
management.
[898—15]