ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٧‎٦] (٤٥٠/١٥٠)

5 . That the French contingent contains a number of recruits, and probably will
not be fit to go inland till about the 15th December, without, that is, its
French personnel. Colonel Bremond suggests that then it could be best
employed as a single group, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cadi, on the eastern
road to stiffen the Arab force. He said, too. that an engineer company
could prepare field defences at Babegh.
On the same date Sir H. McMahon further telegraphed [No. 966] that Colonel
Wilson had informed him that the Senior Naval Officer, who had just reached Jeddah,
said that the situation at Babegh was no cause for immediate anxiety; there was but
little foundation, in fact, for the report of the Turkish advance. Sir H. McMahon
added that Colonel Parker had informed him that an exaggerated report of a recon-
naisance of eighty camel corps men at Shatira was the origin of the news of a Turkish
advance.
On the 7 th November Sir B. Wingate sent a long telegram [No. 9j to the Foreign
Office, in which he dealt with the whole situation. Since sending his telegram of the
2 nd November [No. 627], Admiral Wemyss and Captain Lawrence had arrived from a
visit to Faisal’s camp, and he had discussed the situation with them.
In regard to the military situation in Hejaz, at present the salient features
were:—
1. If strongly attacked by the Turks, the Babegh position, even with naval
assistance, would be impossible to hold unless—
(a.) Begular troops (a brigade at least), with artillery, could arrive there in time,
and this is ruled out by the decision of the War Office that troops are not
available ; or
( 6 .) A trained Arab force of about 5,000 men, with artillery, were available for
defence ; as to this, see under “ Arab Trained Band.”
2 . The necessity for keeping in the field the most important group of Arab
tribesmen ; those, that is, who have hitherto operated under Faisal, who during the
last five months (they being 3,000 in number) have operated on the hills on a line
Kheif-Shofida Ghayir, with their base at Hamra and Bir Ibn Hassani, and have
constituted the sole Arab defence against a Turkish advance south.
With the full concurrence of the naval Commander-in-Chief, the Sirdar proposed
to supply to the tribal army now at Kheif, &c., the moral and material support (guns,
machine guns, aeroplanes) necessary to enable them to continue their attempts on the
Hejaz rail way and their defensive in the hills. If they are successful in this, time will
be given for the development of action as proposed under the following headings :—
(1.) Babegh.
This will be the British aeroplane station, the training ground for the new Arab
trained bands, and a naval base for (group undecypherable) Arab military forces.
(2.) French Contingent.
Its training can be completed at Babegh, to which place it will proceed direct.
Acting on the spirit of instructions received from the Foreign Office, the Sirdar would
now convey orders to this effect to Colonel Brbmond.
(3.) Arab Trained Bands.
For the garrisoning of Babegh, and the provision of a stable element with armed
tribesmen in the field, the necessity for an organised and trained Arab force is obvious;
and for such trained bands the Sherif has collected a promising lot of townsmen and
villagers. The rapidity with which this force can be made efficient depends on the
possibility of at once providing a nucleus of partially trained men. The Government
of India has therefore been requested to send as soon as possible such a proportion of
Arab military [? prisoners] now in India, as may be fit for active service. Arab
officers from India confidently expect that a good percentage of these prisoners would
join the Sherif; if this should be so, the problem of trained bands would be simplified.
A strength of 5,000 is aimed at. Sir A. Murray will assist as far as his resources
permit in the equipment, but such requirements as Egypt and Sudan cannot supply
must be sent from England.