ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٧‎٢] (٤٥٠/١٤١)

f ° Ur t r r T f° 0d f J' iends While we reS P eet their iodependence.
m a k- P d , !o P - y £ rdtefu }, lor th « hel P we have given them, but they fear lest we may
couttrfL for themTh h6m f'- We a PP ro P riated too many Moslem
afraid 'of n F'mP 1 T' re ? 1 * rust ln 0 ' ir disinterestedness, and they are terribly
' anDroval knd 7 R 0 b° U k 11 Ii ' the British with without the Sherifs
o-rovesand d dSlt - RabeSh a- arl V ed f ° r0e Str011 S enough to take possession of the
groaes and organise a position there, they would, I am convinced, say, ‘ We are
‘khpOtT ' an< Sca ;, ter * 1 ° * he j r ‘“t. 8 - Sfcress has often been laid on the point that the
en a s personally asked for British troops to be landed when the urgent moment
comes. is woi ding snows Ims reluctance sufficiently; and when that urgent moment
comes ween che resi stance of tribes collapses and theSberifs revolt has come to an end
he will be the minority ol one. 5
cm i^ d0 / 10t ^ hl v k an T ° ne who has exam i n «d Hejaz lately will contest that the
k.herifs strength lies only among the tribes, and it follows that when the tribes go
over to the lurks there is no more “ Sherifs movement.” 6
The objections to the landing of a British force do not apply to aeroplanes. The
Arabs look upon these as delightful [one group undecipherablejs and are longing for
them ; they also want instructors in technical matters (artillery, machine-guns, bombing
W. I., and armoured cars) and are prepared on these (?) grounds to welcome the French
coiitmgent and anything we like to send. No European escort is necessary, if they
behave tactfully and follow local advice, and if the Turks break through prematurely
(a.s they may do if reinforced) the personnel and all the light equipment can be
disembarked and the rest destroyed.
The French Military Mission sees in a different light. They say: £i Above all
things the Araos must not take Medina. This can be assured if an Allied force landed
at Babegh. The tribal contingents will go home, and we will be the sole bulwark of
the Sheur m Mecca. At the end of the war we give him Medina as his reward.”
This is of course a definite policy, agreeable to their larger schemes- It breaks
down, I think, in the assumption that an Allied force at Babegh would defend Mecca
for good and all. Once the Turks are able to dispense with the tribal resistance, they
will be able to advance along any of the central or eastern roads to Mecca, leaving the
iranco-Britisii force a disconsolate monument on the dusty beach at Babegh.
The policy of not landing a British force at Babegh should not be made an excuse
for doing nothing in Hejazu If we spare ourselves this expense and trouble, it is all the
more incumbent upon us to stiffen the tribal army, on which we are going to rely for
the defence of Mecca. This stiffening is (by request) not to consist of personnel, but of
materials. Sherif Faisal asked nearly four months ago for three batteries of Q.F.
mountain guns, and not only have none been sent, but he has not been given any
written or verbal answer to his demand.
There may be no Q.F. mountain guns in the British army: there are plenty in
Greece and Italy and France (and perhaps in Portugal) ; the British Government can
certainly supply them if it wishes, and if it does not it must take the resoonsibility if
the tribes’ resistance fails, and they will certainly not carry on for an indefinite time in
the present circumstances. On the other hand, if they are given these guns (whose
value will be mainly moral) they will, in my opinion, be able to hold up the present
Turkish force as long as they require. Their moral is excellent, their tactics and manner
of fighting admirably adapted to the very difficult country they are defending, and
their leaders fully understand that to provoke a definite issue now is to lose the war.
To continue the present guerre de courses is sooner or later to wear out the Turks
completely, aud force them back on a passive defence of Medina and its railway
communications.
IBN SAUD.
Sir Percy Cox telegraphed on the 13th November that he had met Ibn Sand at
Ojair on the 11 th November and the following day. The upshot of their conversation
v\as that it was not practicable to bring about effective co-operation with Hejaz, but
with certain material assistance a demonstration against Ibn Bashid was feasible.
Ibn Sand was coming on to Bahrein, with a view of proceeding thence on a rapid visjt
tp the Shaykhs of Koweyt and Mohammerah by water ; it was being arranged that
H.M.S. “Juno should take him to Koweyt. From Mohammerah, if army commander
had no objection, Sir P. Cox proposed to arrange for a short visit to Basra. Ibn Sand
recently arrested the Turkish emissary and handed over to our agent the 700 camels
which the latter had bought. He, Sir P. Cox, recommended that the K.C.I.E. should
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