ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [و‎‎٧‎١] (٤٥٠/١٣٩)

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Ihese numbers are purely “ conjectured,” since they vary in strength from time to
if they about d t ay fl°| d t ay ' ^ ^ ^ , r e '* Uy ° f ex Pansion, especially
nnmhJrof -fl * o? fig ^ t , an engagement. Their numbers likewise depend on the
350 AnbofWr Wh ' C , h we 1 0a “ them ' They are strengthened bv about
^itht cert!?n a ? d m ® n p brou ? ht h ' om India by four batteries of Mountain Artillery
/ * I ntrtam number of Egyptian gunners and a fair number of machine guns. I came
omtl 6 °f nCinS10n tha , t the tl ‘ ree bror , her ? preferred to keep their commands separated
Ir ? r le n®°ne o prestige, partly for territorial reasons, and partly on account of
sma l animosities amongst their dtfferent followers This, however, does not mean they
would not concentrate against Medina, bat simply that if p-ssible they prefer to act
i, pendenth t wou 1 ul , be as wel1 to consider here their strength and weakness, what
they are capable or, and what we cannot expect them to undertake.
Fust then, as to their leaders. Faisal is a capable, trustwon by leader, of undoubted
abiuty—ol nervous,yestiess disposition, and a strong desire to go to the Syrian sphere,
^F e . ie ^ believe Ins influence is great. Ali is no soldier, nor does he care for militaiy
a airs -y - 6 18 ^ politician. ^ Abdulla, whom I did not meet, is reported to be the most
fv e °r ? ' 5 j n r ^ s a so ^ r ^ er an( ^ politician. Their followers are brave, hardv, and
bitterly hate the lurk; they appear to lie good natural shots, and can and will tmht
exceedingly well under conditions to which they are accustomed. The forces are
mobile and self-contained. Their strong points are night fighting and guerrilla fightim-
at both of which they excel. They are greatly impressed by "artillery, both for and
against them, but this does not mean they will run away when shelled; they put up a
good fight at Bir Darwesh in August against artillery, according to Turkish "prisoners I
interviewed taken in this fighting. We cannot expect them, fthink, to hold entrench
ments, especially under artillery fire. Aeroplanes for or against them impress them
immensely. Their leaders are very impressed by victory or defeat; apt to rather
magnify ooth. All these points aie of importance when we come to consider our own
action in conjunction with theirs. Their ideas of tactics and strategy are of the
simplest kind. 1 considered All and Faisal both very friendly to ourselves, especially
the latter, and they are certainly both men of integrity.
Apart from these forces, which 1 have put at a minimum, and which might be
considerably mcieased, we have to consider that there are a large number <>i tribesmen
now silting on the fence who would, after a real success or a good prospect of it, double
or treble their numbers, as a reverse would bring these clans in against them. Such,
then, are the two contending forces. We must next consider the country.
The country favours the Arab forces as much as it increases the difficulties of the
Turks. The pilgrim road to Mecca is through hilly and rocky country most difficult to
negotiate, most suitable for Arab tactics, and has a bad water supply. The Sultani
road is difficult till it debouches on to the plains, where it is fairly easy to traverse.
It has numerous wells. I am told that during the rains it is also quite feasible for the
Turks to use the eastern road. The shortest and best road is the “Sultani,” but
Babegh bars it.
The Objectives of the Arabs.
As the Turkish objective is Mecca so the Arab objective is Medina, and the capture
of this city would have fur the Arabs an even greater result than the capture of Mecca
by the Turks.
They have as a further and ultimate objective Syria, and undoubtedly the fall of
Medina would facilitate the conquest of the former, since so many elements there are
hostile to the Turks.
To carry out their objective they have the forces we have enumerated ; in addition,
they have the aid of Asaaf and his Arabs as a constant menace against the Hejaz
railway. The Arab forces are far more powerful than at first appears. They are
gradually becoming more efficient, by their actions against their enemy, by the arms we
are supplying, and the further military support we propose to give them. At their own
tactics they are a force to be taken very seriously. The most important factor to
notice is that they do not need communications as we apply the term to our own forces.
If they feel they are seriously threatened they retire rapidly and appear again at
another place where the terms are more favourable. There is therefore no chance of the
Turks being able to surround them or of our going to their rescue. The most the Turks,,
under the most favourable circumstances, can expect to do is to inflict casualties and
disperse them. Given a rallying point they will appear again as strong as ever. Their
“ supply ” needs are very small comparatively, their mobility great, the country no
pbstacle, the climate no drawback as it is to their opponents.