ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٧‎٠] (٤٥٠/١٣٨)

The Turkish Objective.
The immediate Turkish objective is, of course, Mecca, but their ultimate objective
is far wider in scope and of vaster importance than the mere occupation of the holy
city. It is of the utmost importance that we should verv briefly study this aspect,
since the whole Turkish plan will be based on the following considerations:— p"
Politically. —The Turks cannot afford to lose control of the holy places ; to do so
would be to abandon, or at any rate subordinate, their hitherto vast influence
over Mohammedan peoples.
Materially. —They cannot countenance the loss of so great a territory.
Militarily. —From a defensive point of view they run grave risk of bringing in
against them large forces, and for the protection of Syria and Mesopotamia
they must crush the movement.
From an offensive standpoint the movement prevents them using from
two to three divisions in other spheres, eliminates the proposed preaching of a
“Jehad,” dislocates their plans for fostering unrest in Africa and India, and
bars their road to Aden.
There are other considerations of equal importance which it is not necessary to
mention here, but the points mentioned are of sufficient importance in themselves to
convince us that the Turks will, if they possibly can, make a serious attempt to restore
the situation. We have estimated, as far as our uncertain information goes, the weapon
they possess to do it, and we must next consider how they may possibly employ the
means at their disposal.
To their advantage they have (a) an organised, disciplined, and well-led force of
hard-nitting power; (b) they have a single purpose, a derinite policy, and a clear
objective as against the dissensions of the Arab tribes; (c) they have the choice of
time and direction, in other words, the initiative ; (d) the influence of their victories,
real or supposed, in other spheres to pacify tribes who would otherwise be openly
hostile.
Against them they have (a) a long, arduous road through hostile country suited to
Arab tactics ; (b) the great difficulties of transport and water ; (c) a brave, hardy, mobile,
and bitterly hostile people ; (d) British sea-power and assistance ; (e) when once (if they
are able) they have reached Mecca they have 250 miles of communications to keep open
through hostile country; (/) a long vulnerable line of railway which has been cut twice
and is a constant source of anxiety to them.
lo carry out their plan, therefore, they need the most careful preparations. These
are likely to be of the following nature :—
They will naturally advance their base or starting point as far to the south of
Medina as possible, to shorten their line of advance and give their force a maximum of
supplies, io save time and so cut dowm transport. They will not move till thev are
ready in every detail. YY hen they do move we may expect them to move with the
greatest speed possible, ^ which will not be great if they have camels. They will, I
feel convinced, move self-contained, by which I mean they will not leave posts alono’
tneu route. I must confess I am rather alone in this idea ; its importance is so threat
that I must explain my reasons for my conclusions. To leave posts along a broad
^50 miles in length m hostile coautry would necessitate (a) their being strong to
resist attack ; ( 6 ) fairly close together to allow supplies to be distributed; fc) organised
for defensive purposes. From the point of view of wastage alone 1 do not see the
possibility of the Turks doing so. I consider that if they move they will move in
tue gieatest possible strength at the greatest possible speed straight for Mecca.
Having arrived, by wholesale hangings and terrorism they will try to subdue the
movement by fear and terrible punishments to any opposition. They will reward and
bribe those tribes friendly to them, and by moving south from Medina and north from
Mecca maintain touch. We may safely conclude that their preparations will be very
thorough, and that they will not move till they have every possible chance of success, '
The Military Situation as regards the Arabs.
Ihe Arab forces are at present organised into three groups :—
The Northern group under Faisal, about 5,000 strong.
Ihe Central group under Ali, from 2,000 to 5,000 strono-,
Ihe Southern group under Abdulla, about 5,000 strong, &