ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٤‎٧] (٤٥٠/٩٢)

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facilitated enemy movements, two British officers whom he bad^ sent to Hejaz to report
on the Arab military situation, and the possibility of preventing a successful Turkish
advance on Mecca, were very pessimistic in regard to both points.
Later in the day he telegraphed again [No. 76], saying that it had been reported
from Babegh by the aeroplane reconnaissance that Wadi Fura was apparently clear offi
the enerav as far as Mukka ; and from Yambo that on the 10 th December a seaplane
successfully fired into and bombed a force of about 400 Turks, encamped -0 miles north
west of [? Nakhl] Mubar[ak]; that the morale of the Arabs at Babegh and Yambo was
somewhat restored ; and that on the 14th December he expected Captain Lloyd and ,
Colonel Bremond with the latest news from Jeddah.
On the 13th December he sent a long telegram [No. 77], consisting of over three
foolscap pages, of which what follows forms tho gist. Captain Lawrence says that
Faisal considers that the loss of Wady Safra has changed the situation, and that the
Arabs would welcome the landing of British troops at Babegh. Colonel Wilson,
Mr. Storrs, and the Sherif discussed this question ; the Sherif considers that the landing
of the British would do great harm, and still asks for Moslem troops. Commenting on
this, the Sirdar recommends holding a British brigade in readiness at Port Sudan, as no
Moslem troops are available. It is understoud that it will take some time to collect
sufficient transport to convey the brigade to Port Sudan. The Sirdar has instructed
Colonel Wilson to explain the situation to the Sherif, and to point out to him that his
decision not to have British troops, except at the last moment, puts upon him the
responsibility for the collapse of the Arab movement, should this come about. Arrange
ment are being made to evacuate the Egyptian detachments at Babegh and Yambo m
the event of a Turkish attack.
ie
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The Question of French Assistance,
The Foreign Office telegraphed [No. 2920] to the Ambassador in Paris on the
9th December, saying that the French Government had proposed to send a brigade to
Babegh, and instructing him to urgently enquire whether they still intended to do
so, how soon it would start, and of what nature it would be.
Lord Bertie replied on the following day [No. 1312], saying that the military
attache had had a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff (General Duportj,
by whom he was informed that the French Government was ready to send immediately
the men at their disposal if His Majesty’s Government would also despatch an infantry
force sufficiently large to support them. This was a necessary proviso, as the
French were only prepared to send one battery of 80 mm., another of 75, and about a
company of machine guns. In a later telegram [No. 1312] of the same date, he says
that he had asked the Secretary-General whether the French Government intended to
send troops to Babegh, and that he had replied saying that his Government still
considered that it was for His Majesty’s Government to furnish the necessary
contingents of infantry. He said, too, that the French Government did not wish to
appear to seek the position in Arabia which seemed to them to belong to Great Britain.
Lord Bertie had already telegraphed [No. 1306] on the 9th December, saying that
he had received a note, dated the 8 th December, from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
enclosing a memorandum from the Minister for War, and maintaining the view set out
m the note of the 13th November that the only way to prevent the reoccupation of
Babegh by the Turks was to land at that place a sufficient infantry force to form a
“ veritable corps de bataille ’; that this force should be provided by the British ; and
that French Moslem technical detachments could only be of use as auxiliaries. The
ships oil Babegh would support the defence, and the barrage thus established would
prevent the Turks from using the coast roads and make the eastern roads difficult for
them. Babegh would become a base from which the Arabs could operate with some
safety in the interior. A further note, dated the 9th December, upheld those views,
the Irench Government being confirmed in them by the Sirdar’s telegram No. 61 [see
Arabian Bepprt, N.S., XX, p. 1 ]. The memorandum of the Minister of War concluded
with the statement that if His Majesty’s Government was not disposed to send
infantry to Babegh, the French technical units could not be landed there. In that case
they would be landed at Jeddah to support the Sherif’s army should he so desire. They
induced na tive officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, Spahis and Tirailleurs,
one 80 field battery, one 80 mountain battery, eight machine-gun sections, and one
Engineer company, and were ready at Suez with some French cadres and experts.
Ou the 11th December the Foreign Office telegraphed to Lord Bertie lel'erring to
toe instructions sent to the Sirdar in telegram No. 36, recorded above, and asking him