ملف ٧٠٥/١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "انتفاضة عربية: التقارير العربية؛ تقارير السير م. سايكس" [ظ‎‎٢‎٦] (٤٥٠/٥٠)

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(b.) He had telegraphed instructions that the evacuation of Habegh was not to
take place unless the Turks should arrive in such force as to make the
aerodrome position untenable—this in view of the probably disastrous effect
on the Arabs and the blow to our prestige.
The Question of Military Rely for the King. ^
Sir H. McMahon telegraphed ^No. 1105] on the 23rd December that he had
informed Colonel Wilson that, before he communicated the king’s final refusal of
military assistance, he wished to he assured by him (the king) in writing, if possible,
that he clearly understood and accepted the following points :—
(a.) That a European force with its transport could not be maintained indefinitely,
and should be transferred, for active employment, to another theatre of
operations.
(5.) Therefore, if in a later emergency he should apply for European troops, they
would not be available.
(c.) The Moslem troops for which he had asked were not available.
(d.) Though the British operations in Sinai were being rapidly developed, and
would have a certain effect on the Turkish dispositions in Hejaz, undue
optimism re
indulged in.
(e.) Henceforward, therefore, the Arab force would be obliged to rely on itself,
with such assistance in war material and expert personnel as we might be
able to supply.
Finally, Sir H. McMahon expressed the earnest hope that the decision not to
accept European troops had been well based and not unduly influenced by pro-Turkish
and religious elements, whose theory and counsel, if followed to the logical conclusion,
might lead to miliary disaster and the collapse of the new Arab kingdom.
I he Sirdar telegraphed [No. 93j on the 23rd December that he had received from
Jeddah by telegram the summary of a letter addressed to him by King Hussein,
who :—
(a.) Reiterated his objections to the landing of Christian troops at Rabegh.
( 6 .) Minimised the services an immobile force could render at that place so long as
Turkish railway communications were open with Medina.
(c.) Could not believe that Great Britain was unable to spare 1,500 Moslem troops
from her 5,000,000 soldiers or from those of her Allies.
garding the immediate result of those operations must not be
dhe Sirdar added that Colonels Wilson and Bremond had gone to Rabegh, and
that the latter had recommended his Government to send two battalions of native troops
to Rabegh. These troops, with naval assistance and the French troops from Suez could,
in Colonel Wilson’s opinion, hold the aerodrome at Rabegh, but not the wells, 4 miles
inland. The Sirdar would welcome this, as the evacuation of Rabegh in face of a strong
Turkish raid would have a very bad effect on the Arabs.
But on the 25th December the Sirdar telegraphed [No. 94xJ that Colonel Bremond
had said that he should inform the French Government that a minimum garrison of
three battalions, with the French contingent from Suez, was required for the defence
of the aerodrome site at R.abegh : but he considered that, unless we were prepared to
send a force, the French Government was unlikely to send Senegalese or other troops.
Publication of the New Title.
The Sirdar telegraphed on tbe- 2 Tth December [No. 92] saying that :
(a.) The publication of the recognition of the Sherif as king seemed to be desirable.
(b.) He proposed to communicate the fact to the Egyptian press if the Foreign
Office concurred.
[The “ Daily Express ” of the 22 nd December printed a Reuter telegram stating,
on the authority of the u Kibla,” that on the 4th November he was declared Sultan
of Arabia.]
Colonels Wilson and Parker.
Colonel Wilsons staff at Jeddah will be shortly reinforced by the arrival of Captain
Bray of the Bengal Lancers, who accompanied the two Indian officers at the time of the