مجموعة ٦ / ٤ (١) "عسير: تولي ابن سعود السيطرة على الإدارة الداخلية لعسير". [و‎‎٢‎٤] (١١٠٤/٥٤)

ENCLOSURE IN FOREIGN
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
1 P.Z. ’
5855
August 16, 1933.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1 .
1933 ,
[E 4700/759/25]
No. 1.
Mr. Calvert to Sir John Simon.—(Received August 16.)
(No. 237.) ^ '
^ r ’ __ Jedda, July 26, 1933.
WITH reference to my telegram No. 140 of the 20th instant regarding the
present position between Saudi Arabia ancTThe Yemen, I have the honour to
transmit to you herewith copies, in translation, of the confidential note from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of a document, purporting to be a telegram
sent from Riadh by King Abdul Aziz to Amir Feisal at Taif, both of which were
left with me by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, Minister of Finance, upon his visit
of the 20th instant, the nature of which was recounted in my telegram under
reference. The absence of Fuad Bey Hamza at Jerusalem has left the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs with no really responsible and capable official, so that it is
not a matter for surprise that Ibn Saud should have instructed his son to entrust
his appeal to His Majesty’s Government for advice to so experienced a Minister
as Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman.
2. I do not propose to retrace the conversation, which has already been,
I think, sufficiently outlined in my telegram under reference, save to record the
exceptional earnestness with which the Minister described the very delicate
relations now subsisting between this country and that of the Imam Yahya. He
reiterated the charge of bad faith and of a deliberately provocative policy which,
if pursued much further, would soon leave Ibn Saud no alternative but a resort
to force. Ibn Saud’s policy was pacific, but any encroachment upon his territories
would be resisted “ until not a man is left alive.”
3. The claims for the restitution of territory that have so thoroughly upset
the Saudi Government are defined in the telegram from Ibn Saud to Amir Feisal
as “the territories of the Idrisi and the districts of Qahtan and Hamazan in
Asir.” I am not clear that this is a cool demand for the evacuation of the whole
of Asir, but it unquestionably means a very considerable slice of that province.
Qahtan is a little obscure, and Hamazan I have so far been unable to identify.
The Handbook of Arabia, vol. I, Chapter V, on Asir, p. 132, states “in the
south-eastern interior of the region live the six Qahtan tribes, each an autonomous
unit, and none of them to be confounded with the nomad Qahtan of the south
western region of Central Arabia.” Yet no mention of the Qahtan is made in
the list of inland tribes at p. 134, though they are referred to at the foot of
p. 137 as breeders of horses and the most enterprising traders of the interior.
It would therefore seem likely that the perturbation of Ibn Saud arises from
attempts of the Imam to suborn these tribes from their nominal, and perhaps
divided, allegiance to King Abdul Aziz. I have recently received reports, in
which I do not at present place much reliance, that Imam Yahya, through the
intrigues of his eldest son, by subsidy and by the taking of hostages, has, indeed,
established himself strongly with the tribes of the Najran.
4. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty’s Ambassador at
Rome, His Majesty’s High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan, to His
Majesty’s Chief Commissioner at Aden and to the senior naval officer in the
Red Sea sloops, and a paraphrase of my telegram under reference is being sent to
His Majesty’s High Commissioners for Egypt and Transjordan.
I have, &c.
A. S. CALVERT.
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