مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [ظ‎‎٣‎١‎١] (٦٤٤/٦٢٤)

12
in March 1945 but, at the request of the Persian Government, the United states
Government allowed them to stay lor the time being. Results of their work are
less and less in evidence. The members of the mission appointed to provincial
formations attempt, with varying success, to supervise the supply situation and
transactions. Those at the centre limit their functions to giving some unheeded
advice on transport and medical services and act as agents for the supply of such
material as the Persian Government can afford to buy from the United States.
57. The strength of the Persian army stands at about 90,000 officers and
men, from which must now be deducted the 6,000 men of the Azerbaijan Division
who, after their surrender, either drifted away to their homes or possibly joined
the rebel “ Democrat ” army. A Bill to provide a credit of 165 million rials for
the raising of two additional infantry divisions of about 6,000 men each was
passed by the Majlis in September 1945. Up to the end of the year recruiting
on a small scale had started in Hamadan Province for one of these divisions. ^
credit of 35'million rials was also granted by the Majlis for the improvement of
the living conditions of Persian officers which, with their miserably low rates
of pay and the fantastically high cost of living were appalling. Free houses in
the vicinity of barracks, a small annual increment, a children’s allowance, two
free issues of uniform per annum, and the creation of a co-operative society for
the supply of certain staple commodities at rates cheaper than those prevailing
in the open market were the items in this programme of financial relief. A further
credit of 3 million dollars for the purchase of stores (mostly clothing, boots and
medicines) from the United States was also passed.
(c) Morale .—From the point of view of their effect on morale two events
occurred in 1945 which were of the greatest importance, viz. :—a mutiny among
the officers and the surrender of the garrisons in Azerbaijan. Regarding the
mutiny the story is as follows. Despair over their financial embarrassment,
discontent at the slowness of promotion, disgust at the incompetence of their
seniors had for some time been felt by most Persian officers. The Russians were
not slow to notice this and, both directly and indirectly through their agents
the Tudeh party, fanned the flames of this discontent, in mid-August eighteen
officers of the Meshed garrison headed by a lieutenant-colonel in the Supply
Department obtained possession of a jeep, two lorries, a W/T set and arms and
ammunition. To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles
by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks. (Sugar,
though more effective, is too expensive in Persia.) With the connivance of the
Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made
their way to Bujnurd, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph
lines between Meshed and Kuchan. On arrival there they gave out that they
were come on an inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. This they
disarmed and made for the Turcoman steppes. It was thought in Meshed, and
the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would
join forces with a band of armed Turcomans said to number between one and
two thousand, and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff,
having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of
their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with
whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the
Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He
acted therefore on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading
and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Havino- no
troops in Gunbad-i-Qabus, through which place they must pass he asked for
the assistance of the gendarmerie who acted with the greatest promptness and
energy. The local commandant, a lieutenant, hurriedly collected the men from
their scattered posts and was able to assemble a force of about 1\ companies
before the mutineers put in an appearance. They demanded right of wav but
were refused. A battle then ensued in which the gendarmerie, first putting the
vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer
officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles,
arms and ammunition were recovered. The next day three officers and four men
were picked up in an exhausted condition nearby on the road between
Gunbad-i-Qabus and Shahrud. Later, six officers from the Tehran garrison,
headed by a lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff, deserted and effected a
junction with the Meshed mutineers just before the skirmish at Gunbad-i-Qabus.
These seven, and six of the Meshed mutineers, are still at large. Two others
from Tehran and Tabriz who deserted later also joined them° In Tehran a
commission was appointed to examine the antecedents and contacts of officers