مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [ظ‎‎٥‎٨] (٦٤٤/١١٦)

go aground. In this area special local conditions have led to the adoption of a
special rule whereby vessels are required to pass starboard to starboard instead
of port to port. The general manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company drew
the attention of Major Bayendor to this special rule, supposing that the Chahbaaz
might have sinned in ignorance. But Major Bayendor replied that he recognised
only the ordinary rule of the sea, and that special rules made by the Port of
Basra would be systematically ignored by his ships.
81. The resident-director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company subsequently
mentioned this and similar cases to the Minister of Finance, and represented
the serious loss which the Persian Government as well as the company would
suffer if a tanker were to run aground or explode, or if the Rooka Channel were
to be blocked for a prolonged period. Similar representations were made later
by His Majesty’s Minister to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it is doubtful
whether either Minister had the courage to state the truth to the Shah or the
military authorities.
82. Apart from the Persian navy, the Persian customs authorities gave
much trouble in the river. On the 6th December, 1932, a Koweiti dhow pro
ceeding from Koweit to Fao with a consignment of sugar was arrested by a
Persian customs launch. The crew of the dhow maintained that they were lying in
midstream at the time. The Persian authorities maintained that the dhow was
ashore on the Persian bank, and that the intention to smuggle the sugar into Persia
was obvious. They admitted that the master had a manifest for Fao, but
professed to regard this as a blind. The crew managed to escape after nine days,
but the master and the dhow itself were detained. In spite of protests from His
Majesty’s Legation, the master, who was claimed as a Persian subject, was kept
in confinement for twelve months and then brought to trial. He was sentenced
to one month’s imprisonment and a fine. The dhow was still detained at the end
of the year.
83. On the night of the 5th July an Iraqi boatman was shot at and killed
while crossing from the right bank to the Persian island of Muhalla. The other
occupants of the boat reported that he had been shot by a Persian customs guard
on the island. This was at first denied by the local Persian authorities, but later
justified by the Tehran press on the ground that the man was probably smuggling,
doubtless with the connivance of the Iraqi authorities, and that smugglers were
fair game for any customs guard. However, on the morning of the 6th July,
a Persian customs guard, who had gone on board the Japanese steamer Sato
Maru, which was lying in the stream below Mohammerah, was arrested by Iraqi
police on the charge of having shot the boatman. This action was probably taken
in retaliation for the arrest of Captain Macleod, especially as the man was
released later for lack of evidence connecting him with the murder of the boatman.
It seems that the Japanese steamer was outside the limits of the port of
Mohammerah and therefore in Iraq water at the time of the arrest.
84. On the 21st August a Koweiti water-dhow was hailed in midstream by a
party of Persians in a launch and made to sail to a point on the Persian shore. The
Persians were apparently police officials. Whatever their original intentions,
they ended as simple robbers, and, having taken all their belongings from the crew,
left them free to sail away. A complaint was later made to the chief of police at
Gusba, and as a result of his investigations the principal culprit was discovered
and sent under arrest, together with the stolen goods, to Mohammerah. The
goods have not so far been returned to their owners.
(C) Other Countries.
U.S.S.R.
85. At the end of 1932 the dissatisfaction of the Persian Government at the
methods of the Soviet trading organisations had found a vent in the imposition
of an embargo upon trade with the Soviet Union in the Caspian Provinces. This
embargo soon became general, and for most of the year trade between the two
countries was at a standstill. During the winter and spring the Persian Govern
ment showed no sign of being willing to withdraw the embargo unless the Soviet
Government conceded their demands for a real balance of trade, as stipulated by
the commercial treaty of 1931, and for the establishment of a central Persian