مجموعة ٢٨ /٦٧ "بلاد فارس: تقارير سنوية، ١٩٣٢-" [ظ‎‎٣‎٧] (٦٤٤/٧٤)

72
(B) Trade.
Trade in General (1932).
420. The year opened with all markets desperately dull. Iheie &
feeling of hopelessness in the air, resulting from the low volume of business done
in the foregoing months, the vexatious nature of the Trade Monopoly iegulations
and the further restrictions and disturbances to trade which the (aovei nmert^
were known to be intent on introducing in the near future. The fluctuations in
the exchange market contributed to the general feeling of insecunty, while the
depreciation in the local currency added to the heavy burden alieady borne by
importers and consumers. The Soviets showed no real desire to reach an
equitable settlement with the Persian Government, and their purchases of
Persian products continued on a very small scale. Ihe winter was exceptionally
severe and communications seriously interfered with. January coincided with
the fasting month of Ramazan, when trade activity is always at a low ebb. The
cumulative effect of these adverse factors was, indeed, most depressing.
421. As shown in the following section, it was only in March that the
Government’s sugar and match agreement with the Soviets came into force. The
average Persian merchant always dabbled in sugar and looked upon it as his
standby in view of its exceptionally “ liquid ” character. The dislocation which
resulted from the Government’s monopoly of the import and sale ex customs of
this commodity was consequently generally disconcerting. Arrivals from Soviet
Russia were both irregular and inadequate, and what with the Government s
determination to make a profit of at least 3^ krans a man (equivalent to nearly
l\d. a pound) prices rose to extraordinary levels. In Tehran, for instance, the
quotation in December was 22J krans to the batman, or over %\d. to the pound.
422. The Government’s clumsy and rapacious handling of the whole sugar
question and its effect on prices affords an excellent example of their disregard
for the purchasing power and general well-being of the masses of the people, in
whose diet sugar is an essential item. It is interesting to note, incidentally, from
the following table showing how the landed cost of sugar in Tehran is arrived at,
what a comparatively small portion of the total costs is represented by the
transport factor, so formidable are the various taxes which the Persian Govern
ment now levy on imports :—
Cost of sugar at the border : 3-70 rials per man, or (at 102) 1 • 33d. per lb. :—
Rials.
(a) Customs duty ... ... ... 1*55
(b) Monopoly tax ... ... ... 2-00
(c) Surtax on (a) and (b) at 160 per cent. ... 5-68
(d) Road tax ... ... ... ... 1-30
(e) Government profit ... ... ... 3-50
14 03
(/) Export certificate ... ... ... 1-50
(g) Transport from Mohammerah ... 3 00
4-50
Cost of sugar landed Tehran : 22-23 rials per man, or (at 102) just under
8d. per lb.
423. Although trade was very much restricted, merchants found it
increasingly difficult to finance their business. Conditions being generally
unsatisfactory, the banks cut down their credit risks. Capital was increasingly
withdrawn from commerce and invested in land and industry. The capitalisa
tion of the Iran Trading Corporation, the aims of which are discussed below,
accentuated the tightness of money, so much so that in August trade credits were
reported to cost 15 to 25 per cent, per mensem.
424. In October a slight improvement set in, the fall in exchange being
particularly welcome, but the purchases effected by the villagers after the harvest