مجموعة ٥٩/٣٠ "الخليج الفارسي. تأسيس البحرية الفارسية، إلخ" [ظ‎‎٣‎٠‎٧] (٦٢٤/٦١٥)

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At the same time he wished for the aid and assistance which we alone could give to
Persia.
O. I thanked him for this expression of confidence and, without holding out the
slightest hope that his proposals would be favourably considered, said that I would
refer them to you.
7. Now, putting aside the many practical difficulties in the way of meeti^A
his Highness in this matter, I venture with the greatest diffidence to submit
consideration the following suggestion :—
8. His Majesty’s Government, having reluctantly expressed their willingness, in
return for a satisfactory all-round settlement, to forgo £1,510,000 of the agreed debt
of £2,000,000, the latter might be reduced to £1,000,000, while out of ihe remaining
£510,000 a small fleet of contraband chasers might be provided. The Admiralty
would doubtless know the type of vessel most suitable for this purpose, and whether,
supposing the objections to Taimourtache’s proposal were not insuperable, either
British officers could be seconded for service under the Persian Government, or whether
ex-British naval officers would be likely to volunteer for this service.
9. There is one objection which occurred to me but which I naturally did not
mention to the Minister of Court. As His Majesty’s Government and the Government
of India have long-standing and intimate relations with the Arab sheikhs and chiefs
on the southern shores of the Gulf, and as His Majesty’s ships constantly visit and
maintain relations with these sheikhs, it might, it seems to me, be embarrassing
should Persian vessels commanded by British officers in the course of their duties
come into conflict with dhows belonging to these sheikhs and possibly capture them
or cause loss of life. However, on this point the Government of India, the Resident
in the Persian Gulf and the senior naval officer are far more competent to offer an
opinion than I am.
10. Finally, it appears to me to be a question of policy for serious consideration
as to whether it would be wise to adopt a completely non possumus attitude. On the
one hand, the Persians are notoriously the most ungrateful of people for services
rendered to them, and the fate of foreign missions to Persia in the past one hundred
years provides a sorry story. On the other hand, might not a Persian naval
preventive service under British command afford a possible solution of the slave trade
question and render an agreement on the lines proposed by His Majesty’s Government
unnecessary, while minimising the danger of accepting the Minister of Court’s counter
proposal? Again, assuming that the relations between His Majesty’s ships and the
Persian vessels under British officers would be of the most friendly description, might
not this proposal tend to simplify other questions in the Gulf as between His Majesty’s
Government and the Persian Government ?
11. I beg that you will understand that I am not recommending the proposal
and that the above remarks are tentative and only submitted in order to assist a
consideration of the question in all its bearings.
A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.
I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.
August 24, 1929.
P. S.—Since writing the above my attention was drawn to an article in the
“ Shafagh-i-Surkh,” a Persian paper, whose editor, Dashti, has to my knowledge very
intimate relations with the Minister of Court. I accordingly wrote a personal letter to
his Highness enclosing this article, and this morning received his reply. I enclose
copies of this correspondence, from which it will be seen that the Persian Government
are definitely not pledged to purchase the Italian boats.
R. H. C.