مجموعة ٥٩/٣٠ "الخليج الفارسي. تأسيس البحرية الفارسية، إلخ" [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٩] (٦٢٤/٤١٩)

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agreed to abandon this claim in the general treaty now under negotiation, but still
maintains that Persia is entitled to demand compensation for doing so. He has
suggested that the ships referred to above should be supplied by His Majesty’s
Government as a free gift, as a part of the return to be made for the abandonment
of the claim to Bahrein. This cannot, of course, .be entertained, as Sir R. (dive at
once pointed out. There could not well be any question of our making a particulauj^*
concession to Persia as a specific return for her abandonment of her Bahrein elaiin^^
or of our supplying the ships as a free gift.
6. Two separate questions present themselves for consideration :—
(a.) Is it desirable, on general political grounds, that His Majesty’s Government
should make an effort to assist the Persian Government to obtain the
patrol vessels from British sources, lend the officers, &c. ?
(6.) If so, can the financial difficulties, arising from the fact that a free gift
of these vessels to Persia is out of the question, be in any way
surmounted ?
7. There are strong reasons for considering it desirable that, if the Persian
Government really mean in some way or another to acquire these patrol vessels, they
should be encouraged to obtain them from British sources. These reasons may be
summarised as follows :—
(a.) By meeting Teymourtache half-way in his present proposals, our position
in the general negotiations will be strengthened, whereas a refusal to
consider his proposals w-oidd be likely to render these negotiations even
more difficult than they are at present.
(6.) We should show that we were ready to co-operate with the Persians in
their legitimate object of attempting themselves to police their waters,
to control smuggling, and to fulfil their international responsibilities
in connexion with the suppression of the arms traffic and the slave trade
in the Persian Gulf.
(c.) We should help the British shipbuilding trade.
(e?.) If Persia obtains her ships from other sources, she will probably obtain
from those same sources the officers to command the ships, if, on the
other hand, she obtains her ships from British sources, it is likely (as is
shown by Teymourtache’s personal suggestion mentioned in paragraph 4
above) that the ships will be commanded by British officers; and if the
ships w r ere commanded by British officers :—
(1.) The Persian preventive service would be better managed than if
w r e did not co-operate in its development. Moreover, the ships, by
enabling Persia to make some positive contribution to the control of the
slave trade and the arms traffic, might to some extent relieve His
Majesty’s ships of the liabilities which they at present discharge in those
matters, owing to Persian inability to do so.
(2.) From a different standpoint, the presence of British personnel
should go far to reduce the danger of the employment of the Persian
naval force, as might otherwise be the case, to harass the Arab chiefs on
the Arabian coast of the Gulf, with whom His Majesty’s Government
are in close treaty relations, or of its being allowed to act in an arbitrary
or unjust manner.
(3.) We should avoid risk of other European Powers obtaining a
footing in the Gulf astride our air and sea communications with the East.
8. The local British authorities in the Gulf are strongly of opinion that it is
preferable for Persia to acquire her naval patrol service under British auspices as
a British training should give the Persian personnel a British outlook, and this
tendency would be accentuated by the presence in the Gulf of His Majesty’s ships,
which will act as a model. Such experience amongst the Persian personnel should
go far to establish really good Anglo-Persian relations locally, whereas if the
personnel were trained under Italian or other auspices, it is to be feared that not
only the relations between Persians and British, but between Persians and Arabs
and even between British and Arabs would inevitably be exacerbated.
9. The Government of India are similarly in favour of the proposal. They
consider it desirable to keep Italy and other Powers out of the Gulf; and if this
can only be done by our providing ships and personnel, they think that we should
do so. ’ They suggest, however, that the Persian naval forces be kept as small as
possible.
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