مجموعة ٥٩/٣٠ "الخليج الفارسي. تأسيس البحرية الفارسية، إلخ" [و‎‎١‎٢‎٤] (٦٢٤/٢٤٨)

ft* Th» two gttr&o&tt, howwor f which arc due to ho
completed one in ootoher and the other in December of thle
year, come in a different category* While there ie a
raieon d’fttre for the motor weasela, it la difficult to
imagine what uae the lereian Oowernmeat can have for the
gunboats* They are of reepoetable eiao) about loco tone
'mfttrlquca', that ie to say suffielently large te eruiee
about the Oulf, and to oroea over te the Arab shore* It la
this latter possibility which may raise the ieauea already
alluded to* There is no levs lost between Arabs and
Feraiana, and Fersian gunboats cruising In, or Just out*
elds, Arab eaters, with opportunities of harassing Arab
dhows on various pretexts, or of landing their crews on
outlying Arab islands, etc*, will probably sooner or later
bring about regrettable incidents* There will be all the
more reason - from the Persian point of view - for the
gunboats to emroaeh on Arab waters slnoe the Persian
Government still rals® a claim to the territory of at
least one Arab Stats', Bahrain, while the fact that the
officers of the gunboats will be nationals of a European
Power, Italy, will not lessen the delicacy of any
situations which may arise*
6 * There is of course the possibility that the gunboats
may not materialise by default of payment by the Persian
Government, or that if they do materialise, they may suffer
the fate of the old Persian Wavy, which - as represented by
the "Ferecpoils - now lies rotting in Buahlre harbour.
But I do not think we sen count on this, and it would, X
venture te suggest, be advisable te consider now what our
attitude should be In the event of the Persian Navy
becoming a fleet in being 1 * One obvioue method of
control