"ملف ٢/ ٢ I التهريب بين الكويت والعراق" [و‎‎٦‎٩] (٤٤٤/١٤٢)

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willing they he to cooperate. This for the simple reason
that Kuwait
(a) is looked upon by all Bedouin of north east
Arabia as their natural home and market for fill
their wants and it is the policy of Kumit to
encourage this feeling inspite of Bin Baud’s
Blockade;
(b) Kuwait would to-day die a natural death
if this one remaining outlet for her desert trade
were denied her;
(o) Any attempt of the Shaikh to control what the
Bedouin bought or took out would be playing direct
ly into the hands of Bin Baud, and would be a dead
ly blow to his prestige.
Furthermore it would be quite impossible for anyone in Kuwait
to say what was legitimate or what illegitimate trade where
the desert Arab was concerned. They come from the North,
South, and West of the State, and it is not the shopkeepers
concern to aks where their stuff goes, nor indeed would
our friend of the Desert say where he intended to take his
purchases for fear lest one of Bin Baud’s spies in the town r
reported his movements to A1 Bagaawi, Bin Saud’s Chief \
Blockade Officer.
Nor must it be forgotten that the Shaikh of Kuwait,
does all in his power to encourage trade with the desert
tribes in the hopes that all goods will eventually find
their way to Nejd, and so annoy Bin Saud.
Undoubtedly the one and only really effective or
satisfactory method for Iraq to adopt will, in the long run,
be to reduce her customs duties on all imports to the lowest
possible figure that she can afford, this as a matter of
policy . and above all to give up the idea entirely of treat
ing her Customs Department as a revenue producing concern.
IRAQ, is surrounded by long, lonely and ftifficult
frontiers, all eminently aiited to the professional contra
band runners methods. If she maintains her present very
hi$i import duties, as she is trying to do, she will have
to employ large numbers of preventive police, whose upkeep