ملف ١١٨٧/ ١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "بلاد فارس - السياسة. المصالح البريطانية في الجنوب. السياسة الروسية" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٥] (٣٠٠/١٧٧)

3
advisers among the Bakhtiars, but it is probable that such a step would arouse resent
ment at St. Petersburgh, more especially if, as would appear to be the case from the
policy of the Russian consul-general, reported from Ispahan, it is intended to endeavour
to alienate the khans from their tacit allegiance to us.
Again, the situation that must be created in Luristan, if the British railway
.^iterprise, to which His Majesty’s Government and that of India appear to attach
great importance, is to be carried through successfully, may well be productive of
friction between Great Britain and Russia in the future. In order to succeed, not only
in the execution of that undertaking but in its subsequent smooth working, it will be
essential to create a pro-British atmosphere. A start has already been made in that
direction by enlisting the sympathies of the Yali of Pusht-i-Kuh, but there is small
doubt that the Russians are watching developments, and are likely to favour any move
that may be calculated to render the railway scheme abortive. This was clearly
evident when Nizam-us-Sultaneh was in Tehran.
For the above reasons, and for others of a more remote nature that will only
mature if our aims in Luristan and Bakhtiaristan are frustrated, it would appear to me
highly desirable that a limit should be set to Russian penetration into the neutral zone.
A total abolition of the same could, in my opinion, only he effected at a sacrifice of
interests of great value to us, and would also entail the eventual partition of the
Kingdom. Under the purchase scheme, if Russia could be induced to buy under certain
essential conditions what she has already acquired, Russian penetration south might
be effectively checked. It is possible that the best means of inducing Russia to adopt
the idea of purchase would be for His Majesty's Government to carry through the
purchase cf the islands in the Gulf first. Russia would then probably demand a quid
pro quo in the north, and the desired result would have been achieved.
It may possibly seem that the procedure suggested has a “ tricky ” appearance
among friends, but I would venture to point out that despite reiterated assurances,
Russia’s policy in Persia, more especially in the matter of the Ispahan arrangement and
Kermanshah, has not been marked with whole-hearted sincerity towards a friend who
has loyally carried carried out the terms of the bargain made in 1907.
It is of course by no means certain that any Persian statesman would be found
sufficiently courageous to take a step which would involve the alienation of a portion of
the national territory, but the brusqueness of recent Russian action has awakened the
semi-somnolent Persian to a realisation of the fact that certain parts of what is still
called Persia have alreadv passed into Russian hands never to be returned, and that, if
a halt is not called to the present insidious policy of grab on Russia’s part, Great Britain,
whom the majority of Persians still look upon as a friend, whose good intentions towards
Persia are inspired by the greatest of incentives, self-interest, will find herself forced in
sheer self-defence to adopt a similar policy, in order to preserve her interests and
position. Nothing can stop the development of what is in full swing to-day but the
adoption of a scheme which would not only enable Persia to treat for freedom in the
management of her own affairs, but would also put her in possession of funds with which
to put her house in order and make a start upon a programme of public woiks which
will immensely improve the economic situation of the country.
I have, Ac.
WALTER TOWNLEY.