ملف ١١٨٧/ ١٩١٤ الجزء ٢ "بلاد فارس - السياسة. المصالح البريطانية في الجنوب. السياسة الروسية" [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٤] (٣٠٠/١٧٦)

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' to see how this tendency can be checked, unless the zones are delimitated afresh in sucli
a manner as to give almost the entire neutral zone to Great Britain. It is improbable
j that Kussian public opinion would accept such an arrangement.
Were the Persian Government to propose to the two Powers a sale of certain
: territories as sketched in M. Mornard’s memorandum a condition would doubtless be
I attached that the system of zones should be abolished, in order that Persia might hav^
complete liberty of action in what remained to her, all due assuiances being of course
given for the proper protection of the British and Russian interests already established.
I am of opinion that such an arrangement would be greatly to our advantage as things
stand to-day. We could easily make our own terms to protect our various interests
and we should no longer feef that the steady Russian pressure from the north is
jeopardising our rights which under the convention aie very vulnemble. Our position
in the Gulf would be rendered unassailable by our possession of the islands, cpnte apart
from the possible future value they may have as oil-producing units or for purposes of
storage.
I
X presume that His Majesty’s Government are of opinion that British interests are
best served bv a Persia sufficiently strong to act as a butler between Great Britain and
Russia in the Middle East. Such a Persia can never, it has been clearly demonstrated,
be created under the P.)07 convention. Half the country is directly under Russian
influence, a portion is undecided, and the insignificant remainder from the point of view
of Tehran politics, owns British allegiance. Meanwhile, the Central Government has
no authority and never can have any authority so long as its hands are tied by the
necessity of considering the wishes of one or other Power, or of both. A hank
protectorate would afford the country a better chance of making progress than the
present most unsatisfactory system.
If Russian aspirations in Azerbaijan or elsewhere could be satisfied by a sale of
territory, Persia could be rendered free to look after her own affairs; she would have
money with which to pay her most pressing creditors, and she would still have money
over with which to carry out public works and maintain a sufficient force to guarantee
law and order. Given a chance to manage their own affairs themselves, there are
plenty of men in Persia to-day capable of doing so, and I feel convinced that, if she
were given a fair start, Persia could not only rise again, but she could become a much
more enlightened and useful State than she has ever been before. r l he position at
Ispahan could be settled with a stroke of the pen. If the arrangement made between
the Zil-es-Sultan and the manager of the Russian Bank were cancelled, the situation
would become normal again as far as the interference of the Prussian consul-general in
the administration of the province is concerned.
This question of Ispahan is one that is likely to be fruitful of much trouble for our
interests if the Russians are to be allowed to maintain the paramount position they have
acquired there. The Bakhtiaris are closely identified with Ispahan. For the last four
or five years the Governor-General has been a Bakhtiari. Should a Russian nominee,
other than a Bakhtiari, be appointed, it is more than probable that the chiefs of this
fickle and money-loving tribe would make up their minds to come to terms with the
Russians much in the same way as the Zil-es-Sultan has done. All Persians are prone
to side with the stronger, more especially if pecuniary advantage is likely to result
therefrom. We have seen from recent reports from Ispahan that there is good reason
to believe that the present Russian consul-general, inspired doubtless by the manager o
the bank, who knows the local conditions thoroughly, has made overtures to t e
Bakhtiaris through the representative at Ispahan of the Haji ilkhani family, whose
fidelity to British interests is perhaps Itss well assured than that of the ilkhani family.
At the same time certain of the khans residing at Tehran have warned me that, n a
seen that the British Government means to abandon Ispahan to the Russians, we sha
lose their allegiance. This would mean that the important Ahwaz-Ispahan trade
route would pass under a foreign influence inimical to the penetration of bntis
commerce into Central Persia, and that a hostile wedge would be _ driven down m ^
Arabistan. We should, moreover, lose an invaluable link in the chain of that raI H a ^
of protection by local levies which seems to me essential for the protection o
British oil interests now established along the Gulf littoral. _ . . the
Ever since I have been at Tehran 1 have been at great pains to maintain ^
cordial relations I found existing between this legation and the Bakhtiari k ans.
think that I have had some measure of personal success, but I feel that the pom ^ ^
ephemeral and that for that rea c on it is most desirable that some means S10U j
found of torging a stronger and more durable chain binding together our f!" n ^
Bakhtiari interests. Much might be done by the presence of British ofhcers -