ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [ظ‎‎٢‎٣‎٧] (٤٨١/٤٧١)

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T K \j E G \i A M N.
(1) 19th November. -Following for D.M.O. from Mark Sykes, No. 18
I am waiting here for opportunity of seeing General Officer Commanding
and High C ommissioner in accordance with your instructions. By favour of
Cheetham 1 have seen correspondence relating to Arab movement and Sherif
I wo difficulties strike me :
(«) Arab want of confidence in our might.
(h) Difficulty of makiug arrangements with Arabs inoffensive to
Tench susceptibilities, based on financial interests and historic
sentiment.
I suggest as means of coping with difficulty (a) that we block Cilician
Gates or deny 1 urkish access to Syria via Adana Plain, as first step As
second step, occupy line A in tab, Birijik, Suverek, Diarbekir, and establish
ouch with Russians while I urkish and German masses are unmobilised bv
the Anatobaii and Armenian winter snow, leaving Arabs to do as they please
south of this line Details of this scheme and quantity of troops required
should reach you by 24th instant. 1 * squired
Difficulty (b) could be coped with as follows :—
Entente to agree with Arabs to recognise, respect, and protect Arab
prousional government or governments in the vilayets of Boymut, Aleppo
amascus, Jerusalem, and Hedjaz, and sanjaks of Derzor and Urfa during
the war, and to guarantee above areas as minimum of independent Arab
tei ntory after the war in excess of Arabia proper. Arabs to engage not to
F ai f conc( j sslo ^ s dim-tly or indirectly to financial groups of central Powers
< a peiio< ol ~o years, nor to establish diplomatic relations with them for
a period of 10 yeers. Great Britain, Russia, and Italy ,o engage to
obtain concessions m vdayets of Aleppo, Beyrout, Damascus, of saniaks of
a without appioval of trench Government, and to recognise the spirit of
previous agreements between French Government and Otto, an Govern
ment with regard to educational establishment in same area in suited’
Arab independent State or States. ^ suggested
1 further suggest that vilayets of Bagdad and Basra are incapable of
J-goTrnment, and a new and weak state could not administer then owimr
toShia and Sunni dissension. We might agree with 2-2, t , g
these provinces on their beluilf, allocating certain revenuest^iASqTr
exchequeis, this corresponding to their demand for subsidy and further
I feel that 6 wT S " t ^ es 1 t . 10ns becai * se I believe that the situation is critical
the future,Sss“S 'Zl™ ‘d
strong repercussion in north Africa both French^and would
Entente Powers in defensive operations against isla^n ^ a11 the
(-) 21st November.—Following for D.M.O. No. 19-
It I saw FarukTi'^an'i 1 a'iShlg'FrCdi^ IVevmus to getting
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