ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٦] (٤٨١/٤٦٨)

coherent general policy with regard to Islam in the Near East. 1 am
unacquainted with the stage of Indian Mohammedanism, but I think the
suggestions included in this despatch might be of interest to the India Office.
Majord Jeneral E. C. Calhvell,
ITirector of Military Operations,
W ar Ofiice.
I have, &c.,
No. 19 (Secret).
Aden,
Sir, l()th August 191").
In the following despatch I have the honour to give the results of
various conversations with the further persons whom the 1 Ligh Commissioner
recommended me to see in connection with the situation in Turkey.
Sy’ad P. Z.yglool.
1 had two interviews with His Excellency Sa’ad P. Zaglool, who is still
regarded as the leader of constitutional opposition. Sa’ad P. Zaglool, in the
course of many observations, expressed the opinion that to those of advanced
views the declaration of a Protectorate had come as a disheartening blow,
inasmuch as it put an end to the theory that the occupation was not a
permanent institution. He, however, agreed that the idea of an absolutely
independent Egypt was not one which could be entertained, and that for
purposes of defence, finance, and foreign relations Egypt must always
depend on some other Power.
With regard to the position of the Sultan and the want of moral sanction
to his title, with its effect on the people, he considered that the popular
attitude was inevitable but nevertheless bad for Egypt, He cited the
attitude of the people in the Mosques who inevitably give a loud “ Amen "
when the prayer is raised for the Caliph, but remain silent when prayer is
uttered for the Sultan. This weekly demonstration of passive ill-will lie
considered demoralising and of ill-omen for the future.
In reply to a question as to how this could be ameliorated, Sa’ad P.
Zaglool referred to the likelihood of a change of Caliphate and the possibility
of a proper investiture which would go some way towards putting things on
a better footing. As \\'as natural in one in his position, he considered also
that if the Sultan could announce an extension of the power of the Chamber,
and the initiation of something approaching local autonomy in matters which
concerned native 1 affairs alone, would have an improving effect. On this
subject he seemed to regard Caisse de la Dette, Suez Canal, mixed courts,
capitulations, Anglo-Sudanese administration, the army, and foreign relations
as beyond the Chamber’s powers as far as legislation or executive control
were concerned. .
At anv rate he appeared in this matter to hold moderate views, and it
must be admitted that the existence of a Chamber with purely consultative
powers must always give rise to hopes and ambitions that it will eventually
become something more. . T i . i
Sa’ad Pasha mentioned the prooable Imperial Conference that would take
place at the end of the war and appeared attracted by the idea of the Egyptian
Chamber sending a delegate. He said that this had two meanings, one that
the presence of°a representative at the Conference made Egypt an integral
„irt of the British Empire,. which was contrary to the ideas of extreme
nationalists; on the other hand the acceptance of a representative at the
Imperial Conference was of the nature of a guarantee that the limitations of
the 1 Egyptian constitution were not immutable. . . . .
\s regards the Committee of Union and Progress and its activities in
E^*pt Sa’ad P Zaglool was obliged to admit that it was not Moslem nor
patriotic but he had no answer to give as to why its propaganda should be
acceptable to Egyptians he said that only the ignorant were thus led away,
on the other hand it cannot be said that any enlightened Egyptians including
.So’id P Zaolool himself take anv steps to counteract such propaganda.