ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٠] (٤٨١/٤٥٦)

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As examples of the fifth —
Mukhtar’s campaign in the Caucasus, 1877.
1 he Macedonian campaign against the Greeks and Serbs, 1912.
Enver’s campaign in the Caucasus, 1914.
As examples of the sixth—
I he various operations of the Turks in the areas, Macedonia, Zeitun,
Dersim, Ilauran, and Yemen at various dates since 1894.
I hese characteristics which, as will be seen, appear to survive German
training, would suggest that we should (a)'endeavour to light the Turks in
tlie open on the offensive by mobile manoeuvre ; ( 6 ) where we assume a
pure defensive, endeavour to confine them to broken or mountainous
country ; and (c) avoid attacking them in secure positions.
I he key to these characteristics lies probably in the following. Turkish
commanders have, owing to tradition and jealousy, little confidence in one
another or their subordinates, consequently they hesitate to entrust anyone
with an independent action, such as an outflanking march combined with a
holding atiack.
The backbone of the Turkish army is composed of Anatolians, who are
extremely brave but very slow thinkers and movers; a preconceived notion
of the enemy’s position gets in their heads, and an unexpected development
puts them in a panic. Turkish armies once away from railhead are weak in
transport organisation, and supplies are liable to be lost and plundered.
1 hese factors are beyond the control of German organisation.