ملف ١٩١٥/٥٣ الجزء IV "الحرب الألمانية: تركيا؛ الخلافة إلخ" [ظ‎‎٢‎٢‎٨] (٤٨١/٤٥٣)

agents, and especially by letting them drop on sincere ground to run their
own course.
D. We should co-ordinate most carefully our own issue of pamphlets and
in them always be aggressive, demonstrative, and unapologetie; all our
apologies and explanations should be by inference rather than direct. For
this work we require an erudite Moslem staff as well as an English
observation and control.
MILITARY SITUATION.
( 1 ) Hie whole military situation lias been dominated by the Dardanelles
operations. Should these operations lie regarded as having been unfruitful
hitherto, the following considerations should be remembered.
Since March about 500,000 Turkish troops and necessary reinforcements
have been immobilished and subject to heavy loss. Had the Dardanelles
operations not been in progress, it may be assumed that the Turks would
have had approximately 130,000 men in Syria, 80,000 at Baghdad, and
100,000 additional troops in the Caucasus. Such dispositions would’have
immobilised a larger garrison in Lgypt, have forbidden any advance in
Mesopotamia, and menaced the Caucasus and the Russian sphere in Persia.
I he influence on the Moslem world of a constant Ottoman offensive would
have given the German and Committee of Union and Progress agents a far
wider scope in the Caucasus, Persia, the Persian Gulf, Egypt, India, and
Arabia. As it is, these gentry have had some success, but they have been
heavily handicapped by lack of moral support; the minor successes they
ha\p obtained aie indications of what their power would have been had the
Ottoman forces not been concentrated around the Marmora.
( 2 ) The entrance of Bulgaria into the field indicates the possible release
of Ottoman forces from the Constantinople area and their despatch else
where.
This consideration suggests that it would be profitable to consider
certain geographical and climatic factors affecting the movement of large
bodies of troops in the Ottoman Umpire in Asia. The appended map shows
Ity a hatched line the limit of permanent winter snow enduring from about
the 10 th November to the 15th March, which makes mobile operations
practically impossible in Armenia and Anatolia during that period.
from the same map it will also be seen that there are practically only
t iree h^es along which an army can advance from Anatolia or Armenia into
bvna, Mesopotamia, or Southern Kurdistan- to wit, via the Cilieian Gates
via the Sivas-Kharput Road, or via Erzerum and Bitlis. 'The advance of an
army with a fighting head of two divisions along the latter two maybe
ruled out until the middle of March. Thus while it is conceivable that an
existing army of 50,000 men in North Mesopotamia could be reinforced
along these roads during the winter, yet it would be impossible for an army
to come down them as an independent fighting force.
As legards the ( ilician Gates road, if the southern end be blocked at
the opening of the defiles during the winter, a force of 40,000 men could
deny the enemy access to Syria or Mesopotamia along this road for the
duration of the war, provided that the enemy was prevented from raising
an army in Syria. 6
If the enemy dispositions are as follows :—
30.000 men in Syria ;
20.000 men at Baghdad ;
10 , 000 men in North Mesopotamia;
100.000 men on the Russian frontier;
500.000 men at Gonstantinople ;
and presuming that the participation of Bulgaria
400,000 men from Constantinople, the enemy will have
to him.
eventually releases
certain courses open
He has three fronts to consider-he may therefore decide either to-
(l) Concentrate during the winter at Erzerum for a late spring or earlv
summer effort of a decisive nature against the Caucasus, and let
matters rest in Syria and Mesopotamia.