"بلاد فارس والشأن الفارسي من إعداد السيد المحترم جورج ناثانييل كورزون، عضو البرلمان." [‎٦‎١‎١] (٧١٤/٦٨٠)

THE ARMY
611
I might also quote the opinions of Sir F. Goldsmid, Colonel
Val. Baker, and Captain Napier, who spoke in a similar sense; but
I will content myself with citing the verdict of Sir C. MacGregor,
who turned a critical eye upon every branch of the military esta
blishment that he encountered in Persia, and who, in his blunt
but expressive way, said of some regiments that he inspected out
side Meshed:—
They are all composed of more or less fine material. To look at
them without the eye of a soldier was simply to condemn them as a
rabble of dirty, slouching-looking ragamuffins ; but regarded as food
for powder by one who knows the style of article required, they are by
no means to be despised. They are dirty, slouching-looking ragamuffins
certainly; but, brought into trim by English officers, they would very
soon become fine soldierly fellows. . . . They are, taken as a general
rule, men of fine physique and very hardy muscular frames, and just
the fellows to make into very fine soldiers, but they are shockingly
neglected by the Government. . . . God has given the Shah as fine a
body of men as could be wished for, but he does nothing whatever for
them. 1
From this collection of expert opinion, which I make no apology
for having quoted, seeing that a lay judgment on the matter might
Chance of he open to suspicion, it will be seen that, wretched as is
the Persian army at the present time, contemptible as is
its equipment, and low as is its morale, there exists in the country,
and particularly in the Western provinces, the material out of which,
under a more salutary regime, a Persian soldiery might again be
created, worthy of its ancestral renown. I confess that, so long as
the present system continues, I do not see much chance of such a
consummation. Elementary reforms—such as the issue of a single
and simple manual of drill (to consolidate and supersede the dis
cordant fragments of half a dozen different systems), the entire
overhauling of the arms and ammunition, the institution of a proper
code of military punishment, the promulgation of some system of
promotion other than one based upon bribery and corruption, a
permanent organisation of the regular infantry, and a resuscitation,
under less haphazard conditions, of the powerful force of irregular
cavalry which the country is still capable of producing, and better
tuition for officers of all classes—might be introduced, and are
sorely needed. But as long as the whole administration remains
1 Journey through Khorasan, vol. i. pp. 287, 294-298 ; vol. ii. pp. 2, 3, 13-19.
r K 2