"بلاد فارس والشأن الفارسي من إعداد السيد المحترم جورج ناثانييل كورزون، عضو البرلمان." [‎٢‎١‎٦] (٧١٤/٢٥١)

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PERSIA
improved, but a new one opened up from the British possessions
in Beluchistan to the Persian border, avoiding Afghan territory
altogether, and proceeding e.g. from Quetta via Seistan to Birjand.
All of these are feasible measures, and there can be no excuse for
any supineness in developing or facilitating such pacific avenues
of Anglo-Indian influence. The fourth remedy, which has doubt
less engaged the attention of the Indian Government, is an intima
tion to the Am ir of Afghanistan, not on grounds of political economy,
for which I suspect that Abdur Rahman Khan would profess a very
reasonable contempt, but on the grounds of the avowed wish of
the Suzerain Power, that it is desirable to modify a fiscal policy
which is injurious to his own subjects, and displeasing to his chief
allies. The fifth and last remedy, to which I shall revert at greater
length in deal in(r with Seistan, is the construction of a rival
o o
British railroad on the south, to balance the Transcaspian railway
in the north, and enable us to compete with Russia in a fair field,
and with her own weapons.
I now proceed to explain the reasons for which, apart from
the legitimate desire for commercial profit, both Powers—Russia
Eussian and Great Britain—are induced to regard Khorasan with
covetous- g0 infuse a concern, what is the obiective of Russian
ness 01 . # 7 # J t
Khorasan policy in the comprehensive designs which I have
described in this chapter, and what are the counter -interests and
responsibilities of this country. The passion for territorial
aggrandisement is one which, though it is indignantly repudiated
by Russian writers, no one with his eyes open can believe to be
other than a dominating' influence in the Russian mind. There
is a step in the development of every great Power in which the
lust for new possessions is in excess of every other sentiment.
Russia is now in this acquisitive stage of empire. Great Britain,
having passed through it, and having in her day experienced its
intoxicating fumes in all their intensity, has emerged into the
more sober atmosphere of the conservative stage. In other words
Russian interest in Khorasan is the cupidity of the would-be
possessor. England, on the contrary, neither aspires to, nor will
ever hold, a square yard of the country.
If we inquire the ulterior reasons for which Russia desires the
possession of Khorasan, they are not far to seek. Her Transcas
pian conquests have brought under her control a region, the
greater part of which consists of barren wilderness, and whose