مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٤‎٦‎٩] (٩٨٢/٩٤٢)

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/. The first point was that the eyes of the world were upon Iraq at this-
critical stage in the national fortunes. My conversations with my diplomatic
colleagues had shown me that, while most of them hoped that Iraq was now fairly
^ the road to a prosperity which would rival, if indeed it did not surpass, the
prosperity of Egypt, there was a general feeling of anxiety lest,those in authority
should move too fast. There would be no doubt that they had expressed these
views to their respective Governments, and it would be unfortunate if within a
month of Iraq attaining her full independence they found themselves compelled
to report that hasty or ill-considered action had been taken. In the second place,
there were decencies to be observed; the Prime Minister had just returned from
taking his seat with the representatives of the nations of the world in the
Assembly of the League, and an unfortunate impression would be created in the
capitals of Europe if on his return to Bagdad he did not present himself before
Parliament, in accordance with universal precedent, to report upon his mission.
8. These were considerations of external policy upon which, apart from my
own desire to help him, I felt it to be appropriate for me to utter a friendly
word of warning as the representative of the Power which had introduced Iraq
to membership of the League, and to which he had so solemnly assured me only
three weeks before that he felt himself to be peculiarly responsible. There was
a third point which I wished to lay before him as the representative of the Power
with whom Iraq had now for one month been in special treaty relations. If the
reins of government were at any time to be entrusted to an Iraqi statesman as to
whose determination to abide by not only tfye letter but the spirit of the treaty
of 1930 there was or could be the faintest suspicion or doubt, it would have a
deplorable effect upon His Majesty’s Government. In conclusion, I advised him
as a friend not to be hasty in entrusting too much authority to any individual of
whose personal loyalty to himself he was not absolutely convinced. All men had
enemies, and it would be only prudent for him to keep some power in reserve, at
any rate for the present.
9. King Feisal thanked me warmly for my advice, which, he said, was very
precious to him, and dealt briefly with my first three points in turn. He said
that he was not familiar with European standards, but his Eastern friends were
always blaming him, not for haste in action, but for excessive caution. This
reputation he hoped he would continue to deserve. With regard to Nuri Pasha
meeting Parliament, he had already decided that this must certainly be done.
As to the treaty, he reminded me that he had always insisted that any individual
who had publicly opposed it must equally publicly avow the error of his ways
before he was offered any responsible position in the Iraqi Government. Up to a
few days ago he had hoped that Yasin Pasha would be ready to do this, but from
the interview which he had read in the Bagdad press the day before it was clear
that he must abandon this hope. The fourth point he left unanswered. He then
told me that he had been much offended by Nuri Pasha having called a meeting of
the Council of Ministers on Thursday, at which they had passed a resolution
resigning en masse. This resignation he had accepted on Friday, at the same
time asking Nuri Pasha to continue to direct the Government until a new Cabinet
had been formed. He had invited Nuri Pasha himself to undertake this, and
expected to hear from him later in the morning whether he was prepared to do so,
but he feared that it was impossible to bridge the gulf between them.
10. He then talked of Nuri Pasha's delinquencies for oyer an hour,
actually referring at one stage to the personal advice I had given him not to put
too much power in the hands of a possible enemy. I at once challenged this
wilful misapplication of my advice, and said that he knew quite well that there
wms not a man in the country who was, or would ever be, a more devoted and loyal
supporter of himself and his policy than Nuri Pasha As Said. He admitted that
this was true, but said that he and Nuri were like husband and wife : they had
their occasional differences, and must from time to time see less of one another.
I suggested that if this were so, it would be better for them to stay together at
least long enough to avoid an open scandal, and in the end he promised once more
to do his best, and I left him. .
11. I then called at Nuri Pasha’s house, and found that his attitude had
hardened. He said that the root of his differences with King Feisal was that the
latter was continually abusing his position to secure petty personal advantages
for himself and his entourage, and regaled me with a numbei of instances of