مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٤‎٦‎٦] (٩٨٢/٩٣٦)

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moit lnLllnH H ^ 1 ^w a s, I was convinced, one of His Majesty’s
welfJp y fdpnlv Sl J bjects ’ and interested as I was in His Majesty’s
welfaie I deploied the estrangement which had occurred between them. I hoped
and kindn^I °t 18 bj ^ s ^ a .l est y would do his best, by sympathy
’ t0 a . ss .^ e the bitterness which Nuri Pasha must feel' at the loss
^irlv?W denCe he J ery momen t when the crowning success of the work of
near!) tin ee years would seem to entitle him to approbation and gratitude.
11. Ihe King thanked me for my friendly advice and said that hK
disagreement with Nuri Pasha in the realm of politics in no way affected his
personal feelings towards him. He still regarded him as one of his oldest and
dearest friends. The Government had under consideration the establishment of
Legations at Rome and Berlin to be in charge of a single Minister. Possibly
JNun Pasiia could for a time with advantage hold this post.
He then said that he wished to tell me of a conversation which he had
ad the previous morning with the Persian Minister, Saiyid Baqir Khan Kazemi.
Ihe Minister had just returned from a hurried visit to Tehran and stated that he
had been given authority to negotiate with the Iraqi Government the several
treaties and agreements which had already been tentatively discussed. He had
mentioned, in particular, the proposed treaty concerning the Shatt-al-Arab. His
Governments he had said, were especially concerned to remove the disabilities from
which their interests suffered at present in these waters, and were hopeful that the
Iraqi Government, m view of their common interests and close friendly relations,
would adopt a conciliatory attitude in the matter of the rectification of the
frontiers in the Shatt-al-Arab sector.
13. His Majesty had replied that he had thought this issue had already
been settled in principle when Nuri Pasha had discussed it with the Persian
Minister of the Court during His Majesty’s visit to Tehran last spring, and he
was surprised to learn that the Persian Government wished to reopen the question
of the sovereignty of these waters. It was, however, not a matter which he could
discuss himself and no doubt the Minister would take it up with the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs if he had been instructed to do so.
14. He then expressed to me the most serious apprehensions concerning the
intentions of the Persian Government. He feared that they would make their
demands in the Shatt-al-Arab a major political question and might even try to
refer it to the League for settlement. He instanced their obstinacy in the matter
of Bahrein and said that he felt that they would prove to be proportionately more
difficult to deal with in a matter in which far greater interests were involved.
For his part he felt that any limitation of Iraq’s complete sovereignty over the
waters of the Shatt-al-Arab was quite unthinkable and he hoped that His
Majesty’s Government, in view of the Treaty of Alliance, would give their full
support to Iraq in resisting all efforts of the Persian Government to seize part
of this vital channel. He also informed me that Feroughi Khan, the Persian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, had intimated his desire for an audience in a few
days’ time, when passing through Bagdad on his return from Geneva. He feared
that Feroughi, too, would probably endeavour to discuss this issue.
15. I said that my advice to His Majesty was to hold the Persian Govern
ment to the arrangement for a Conservancy Board, which had been provisionally
agreed on last spring. I had myself discussed the Shatt-al-Arab question when
I was in Tehran prior to His Majesty’s own visit, and the Minister of the Court,
to whom I had explained the Conservancy Board proposals, had accepted the
main principles of the scheme as satisfying the claims of the Persian Government.
I assured His Majesty of my sympathy and support in safeguarding the vital
interests of Iraq in any matter which concerned her strategic frontiers^
16. I then referred to the future relations between the Embassy and the
British advisers in the Iraqi Government. I said that I did not wish to convey
the impression that I proposed to interfere in internal administrative matters,
but in our common interest it seemed to me to be necessary that there should
continue to be close liaison between the Iraqi Government and the Embassy.
This could best be done through the advisers, and I hoped that His Majesty
would agree that they should continue to keep me informed about all important
events which might occur in their respective spheres. His Majesty said
emphatically that he regarded it as most desirable that the closest touch should
be maintained between ad risers and the Embassy, and that he considered it
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