مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٥] (٩٨٢/٥٩٤)

■W
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Iraq).
CONFIDENTIAL.
< * ' March 18, 1935.
.C- ^
O
l !935 J
No. 1.
Section 1.
[E 1792/278/93]
Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—{Received March 18)
(No. 130.) ''
Sir, Bagdad, March 6, 1935.
WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 54 and 56 of the 28th February
and the 4th March, I have the honour to report the circumstances of the
resignation of Ali Jaudat Beg’s Cabinet and the return to the premiership of
Jamil Beg A1 Madfai.
2. For the past two months Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, Hikmat Suleiman and
Taufiq Suwaidi, together with a number of extreme Nationalists, have been
seeking, by all the means in their power, to force Ali Jaudat to resign. They
organised a strong Opposition bloc in the Senate, and, by intriguing with
disaffected tribal elements in the Middle Euphrates area, they brought about a
state of unrest which might have developed into an armed outbreak against the
Government. Ali Jaudat also had difficulties with his colleagues. Arshad-al-
Umari had made himself unpopular by his drastic dismissals of senior personnel
from the departments under his Ministry (Economics and Communications), and
had incurred popular opprobrium on account of his loose living. Jamil Beg
A1 Madfai, who commanded the largest vote in the Chamber, threatened to resign
whenever the smallest difference of opinion occurred between him and his chief.
3. Ali Jaudat endeavoured to face the situation with firmness, and sought
to strengthen his position by reorganising his Cabinet. His plan was to drop
Arshad-al-Umari and to persuade Jamil-al-Madfai to accept the Presidency of
the Chamber. He failed, largely because Jamil-al-Madfai threatened to
resign and join the Opposition if Arshad-al-Umari were asked to withdraw.
Ali Jaudat’s resourcefulness was not equal to dealing with this situation, and,
in spite of encouragement from Nuri Pasha, he gave up the struggle and resigned.
4. Acting on the advice of the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber and
of Ali Jaudat himself, the King then sent for iasin Pasha and entrusted him
with the task of forming a Cabinet. His Majesty stipulated that this should be
a Coalition or National Cabinet, that none of those who had recently taken part
in intrigues with the Euphrates tribes should be included, and that he should
not be asked again to dissolve the Chamber. Jhese conditions were, m my
opinion, wise, and their necessity was recognised by Tasin Pasha himseit.
A party Cabinet chosen from the Ikha-al-Watam (party of JSational Bro er-
hood), to which most of the Opposition belonged, could not have secured a
working majority in the Chamber, and to have dissolved a am er w
scarcely been in existence for three months would have mace e ma }
parliamentary government appear absurd. Similarly, to lave r £ tribal
the men who had been principally instrumental m stirring up turbulent tr ^
elements would have created a dangerous preceden , w ic g
“f ’sssasassa..
give up the attempt to form a Government ho on the 3rd March,
6. The King next sent for Jamii-al Maoia , ,
obtained Royal approval for the following Cabme .
Prime Minister : Jamil-al-Madfai.
Interior : Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab.
Finance : Yusuf Ghanimah.
Foreign Affairs : Nuri Pasha.
Justice : Tauriq Suwaidi.
Defence: Rashid-al-Khoja
Economics and Communications .
Education : Abdul Husain Chalabi.
[356 s—1]