مجموعة ١٠/١٧(١) "شؤون داخلية: الوضع السياسي؛ العلاقات مع الحكومة البريطانية" [و‎‎٢‎٦] (٩٨٢/٥٦)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Iraq).
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November 16, 1936.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Section 1.
[E 7145/1419/93] Copy No.
Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received November 16.)
(No. 546. Confidential.)
Sir, Bagdad, November 2, 1936.
EVENTS in Bagdad during the last few days have moved so rapidly that I
have not had, until now, the leisure to do more than to give you a hasty, and, I
fear, a blurred sketch of what has happened. In the present despatch I propose
to try to put before you as full a picture as I can of all that has passed, and, in
another despatch, to venture some speculations upon the effects of the overthrow
of the Yasin Government by the Iraqi army leaders.
2. To all but what must have been a very small group of people, the morning
of Thursday, the 29th October, was nothing but the beginning of a normal
Bagdad day. The Afghan Minister for War had just arrived and had been met
at the station with appropriate ceremonial. Ministers, secure in office, were at
their desks and about their ordinary business (which, at this season, begins at a
very early hour), when, at half past 8 , eleven aeroplanes flew over the town. There
was nothing remarkable about their appearance, because it is the habit of the
Iraqi air force to make the day’s routine flights about this time. But they were
flying lower than usual, and soon were seen to be dropping handfuls of leaflets.
About an hour later I learned what these leaflets contained. It was a manifesto
appealing to the King, in the name of the army, to dismiss the Yasin Cabinet and
to set up a new Administration under Hikmat Sulaiman. It called upon Govern
ment officials to leave their offices until the new Cabinet was formed, and it fore
shadowed the possibility that the army might be compelled to take forcible
measures. It was signed by General Bekr Sidqi, who described himself as
“ Commander of the National Forces of Reform.”
3. The movement had been carefully planned and the secret well kept.
Bdkr Sidqi had chosen a moment when all but two battalions of the Iraqi army
were gathered in the neighbourhood of Qaraghan, on the road to the Persian
frontier, for the purpose of their annual divisional training. Of the two
remaining battalions, one was on the Euphrates and the other was at Mosul.
Bagdad, stripped of troops, lay open and defenceless. The Chief of the General
Staff, General Taha-al-Hashimi, the brother of the Prime Minister, was in Angora
on his way back from Europe. The air force had been called from Hinaidi to
Qaraghan the day before without attracting special attention.
4. At about a quarter to 10 I received a message from King Ghazi asking
me to go to see him. I lost no time in doing so. I found His Majesty in a state
of great nervousness. He told me that he had had bad news which had taken him
rudely by surprise. He assumed that I had already seen the leaflet, but there was
more than that. Hikmat Sulaiman had brought him a letter from Bekr Sidqi
and Abdul Latif Nuri, the generals commanding the two divisions now engaged
in manoeuvres, which made the same demands as those in the leaflet, and which
added that, if King Ghazi did not acquiesce in them, Bagdad would be bombed
from the air in three hours’ time. His Majesty described the helpless condition
of the capital and asked for my advice, making it clear to me that he thought that
any idea of resistance should be dismissed. I asked him whether he had said or
done anything which might give colour to the belief that the movement had his
approval. He assured me that he had not. I asked whether he felt that his
authority was strong enough to check the movement if he allowed it to become
known that he was opposed to it. He said that he did not think so. I asked if
he had consulted his Ministers. He said that he had seen Yasin Pasha about
half an hour before and had found him half minded to resign. I then made to
His Majesty a few obvious remarks about the disastrous consequences that had in
most countries followed the excursion into politics of the army, and I advised him
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