مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [ظ‎‎٢‎٨‎٦] (٧٦١/٥٧٢)

2
would automatically continue to be valid if the Treaty of Jedda itself were to
be prolonged, and it accordingly becomes necessary to consider as a preliminary
to the formal extension of the treaty what modifications should be introduced in
the wording of the original undertaking.
5. The original assurance given by Sir Gilbert Clayton was qualified by a
reference to the conditions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 as prescribing
the procedure which should be followed in connexion with orders for the export
of arms from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia. This convention has never
come into force. Nevertheless, I am advised that it must still be considered
to represent the international standard for the control of the traffic in arms;
it has actually been ratified conditionally by the United Kingdom since 1927, and
it is clearly impossible to replace it for the purposes of the assurance to the
Saudi Government by a reference to the draft convention which was prepared
at Geneva in April 1935 by the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in
and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of. War, and
which has only received a first reading. The convention of 1925 may, in fact, be
considered to have acquired more authority since the exchange of notes with
King Abdul Aziz in 1927, and it is noteworthy that its provisions are utilised
as a standard of control in the Four-Power Treaty of August 1930 regulating
the importation of arms and ammunition into Abyssinia. In the circumstances
I consider that the reference to the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 should be
maintained in any new version of the assurance.
6. I am advised that the actual effect of the reference to the Arms Traffic
Convention of 1925 is to qualify the original assurance of His Majesty’s Govern
ment by making it subject to all the conditions specified in the convention,
including those concerning licences and the machinery to ensure that arms are
destined solely for the Government of the country ordering them. At the same
time articles 33 and 34 of the convention of 1925 introduce safeguards and
qualifications in regard to time of war and the obligations arising out of the
Covenant of the League of Nations and other treaty instruments. Nevertheless,
I remain of the opinion that these safeguards are not sufficient in present inter
national conditions, since it is desirable that His Majesty’s Government should
make provision for embargoes which they might be compelled to impose, not
merely in fulfilment of actual obligations under the Covenant of the League,
but also in accordance with any recommendations of the Council under article 11
of the Covenant; or even for the purpose of taking unilateral action to safeguard
^ 7 In order to enable His Majesty’s Government to fulfil their obligations
and to exercise an unfettered influence for the preservation of peace I consider,
therefore, that Sir Gilbert Clayton’s note of the 19th May, 1927, should not be
renewed but should be replaced, as soon as practicable, by a new assurance to
be given to King Abdul Aziz on the lines of the following formula
“ I am empowered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
to inform you that, subject to the conditions laid down in the Geneva Aims
Traffic Convention of 1925, His Majesty’s Government will not, so long
as the treaty signed at Jedda on the 20th May, 192/, remains m force,
prevent the export from the United Kingdom of arms, &c., purchased by the
Saudi Arabian Government for their own use from manufacturers m e
United Kino-dom, in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, having regard
to developments in the matter of the control of the exports of arms since
1927 His Majesty’s Government must reserve the right to suspend
temporarily the operation of this assurance in circumstances m which the
international obligations of His Majesty’s Government or any circumstances
connected with any war or threat of war should render it necessary.
8. At your own request I have furnished you, without delay, with the
explanations in the preceding paragraphs in order that you may be in possession
of^mv considered views for your guidance if it prove necessary to discuss the
subject wRhKTng Abdul Aziz or his Ministers. At the same time the question
of the supply of arms remains a subsidiary point connected with the renewal
of the Treaty of Jedda, which is in its turn dependent on a satisfactoiy settlement
of the important question of slavery. It would thus be premature for you to
take the mitiative in discussing this particular question until agreement has
been reached on the slavery issue, and the question of the prolongation o e