مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [ظ‎‎١‎٩‎٤] (٧٦١/٣٨٨)

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so fully and so many times by my predecessor, acting on instructions from His
Majesty’s Government. But I did not gather that Ibn Saud was really expecting
a more favourable reply, but only that he was stating his position. Perhaps he
felt that it was the proper thing to do, on the appointment of a new British
Minister, to give a summary of his foreign policy as it affects His Majesty’s
Government. And then the oriental always attaches importance to individuals, s
and hopes thatJB will get him better terms than were offered by B’s predecessor, A.
v 4. I imagine that you will wish me to express my thanks forAhe assurances
'of friendship, and perhaps your particular pleasure, at Ibn Baud’s remembering
occasions beforo the war when the support of His Majesty’s Government was of
assistance to him. and to say, with regard to the references made by Sheikh Yusuf
Yasin to Italy, t^iat Sir Andrew Ryan went into this question so fully and
explained so'clearly th^ attitude of His Majesty’s Government that I am unable
to add anything to what he said. I await your instructions.
•« . v.. i I have. &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
Enclosure.
Br'ief Summary of a Statement made by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to His Majesty’s
Minister on October 5, 1936.
FRIENDSHIP with His Majesty’s Government had long been the basis of
Ibn Sand’s foreign policy. Fie had been in relations with them since the early
days of his career and was grateful for their support. In particular, he was
grateful for the help they gave him at a moment when the Turks were about to
attack him. They asked the Turks to give them a few months’ notice before the
beginning of hostilities, so that British subjects and their property might be
removed from Nejd, and, in the interval, he was able to come to terms with the
Turks. Ibn Saud now saw danger in three quarters : near, farther off, and
remote, viz., Italy, Turkey and Germany. (N.B.—Germany was not mentioned
again.) The Italians had been the last to recognise Saudi Arabia, and their
conduct in regard to Asir and the Yemen had been very suspicious, but at the
time of the Ethiopian dispute there had been a complete revolution in their
policy towards Saudi Arabia. Italy had recently wished to give Ibn Saud arms
and munitions to the value of perhaps £1 million. He had not wanted to accept,
but, to avoid giving offence, he had accepted a few aeroplanes. He had informed
Sir Andrew Ryan, and had asked whether His Majesty’s Government could give
him assurances. He regretted that they had not been able to do more than refer
him to the Rome understanding of 1927.
The Turks were ancient enemies of the Arabs, and resented the rise to
independence and importance of people whom they regarded as savages. It was
fear of the Turks that had impelled him to initiate the negotiations that had
ended with the treaty with Iraq. (Here Sheikh Yusuf Yasin made a brief but
very cordial reference to Iraq.)
Difficulties with Transjordan arose from time to time (Sheikh Yusuf hinted
that these were due to the incurable levity of character of the Amir Abdullah),
but Ibn Saud did not want trouble there. He had always been conciliatory, and
he trusted that with the help of His Majesty’s Government such difficulties as
arose would always be settled satisfactorily. As to Syria, Ibn Saud had made
a point of keeping on good terms with the French. In regard to Palestine, Ibn
Saud had no other aim than to see peace re-established between two parties, both
of whom were his friends.
The statement ended with conventional but strong assurances of friendship.
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