مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [و‎‎١‎٩‎٤] (٧٦١/٣٨٧)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
November 2, 1936.
f
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 2,
2^
E 6851/131/5$]
Copy No. 120
(No. 283.)
Sir,
Sir R. Bullard to Mr.
iSovember 2.)
Jedda, October 11, 1936.
I HAVE the honour to report that, after the exchange of notes on the
3rd October, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin asked whether he could see me about certain
other questions, and it was arranged that he should call at the Legation on the
5th October. He had already asked whether I wished to continue the discussion
of the Koweit and frontier questions or would prefer to await the return of
Fuad Bey Hamza, which was expected to occur very soon, and I told him that
the Saudi counter-draft of article 1 of the proposed Koweit regulations against
smuggling was being considered by His Majesty’s Government, and that, as to
the other matters, it would perhaps be well for me to wait until Fuad Bey’s return,
since I was new to the post, and needed as much time as possible to make myself
fully acquainted with the relevant files. Sheikh Yusuf had made no objection
to this, and had concluded that all questions of major interest were therefore in
abeyance, and that on the 5th October he would discuss minor questions at issue,
such as the blacklisting of certain pilgrim guides. He, however, embarked upon
a long statement on foreign affairs, which, he said, he had been charged to make
by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz. He spoke very carefully, hesitating from
time to time, as though to recall Ibn Sand’s exact words. The statement, however,
was so clearly, in its more important parts, only a repetition of many statements
made to the Legation during the Ethiopian dispute, that it has been possible to cut
down to a page or so the summary which I attach to the present despatch.
2. In reply, I said that Sheikh Yusuf must not expect a detailed answer. I
was new to the post, and I had not been warned what he proposed to talk about.
(I might have reminded him that when he asked for a meeting I had enquired
whether he wished to speak of anything of great importance, so that I might be
prepared, and that he had waved this aside.) As to Palestine, I was happy to
say that, when I was received by Mr. Eden after my appointment, he authorised
me to convey to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz his "personal thanks for the help
offered in connexion with the Palestine dispute. On all other points except one
my remarks were purely conventional. The exception was Italy, though even on
this point I confined myself to generalities. I said that it was clearly impossible
for me to go beyond statements made to the Saudi Government by Sir Andrew
Ryan, acting on instructions from His Majesty’s Government. For myself, I
would suggest that the Saudi Government should take a long view and not think
only of the Ethiopian question, which had been complicated by the fact that
the whole world was trying to find a solution by hitherto untried" methods. The
Saudi attitude towards the Italian offer of money and arms was presumably
prompted by a desire to maintain their independence, an aim which must have
the fullest sympathy of His Majesty’s Government. His Majesty would do well
to look again at the Rome understanding of 1927. It was not usual to give such
assurances as the Saudi Arab Government had wished to receive. What would
happen would depend on world affairs, on a host of circumstances. The King
had at least one solid fact to go upon—the long experience of His Majesty’s
Government to which Sheikh Yusuf had referred with appreciation. I stated
that what Sheikh Yusuf had said would be reported to the Foreign Office, and I
concluded with suitable thanks for the assurances of friendship, and with similar
assurances on our own part.
3. Since the meeting which I have described, I have read with great
attention all the papers relating to the attempt made by Ibn Saud a few months
ago to obtain from His Majesty’s Government assurances that they would assist
him if he should be threatened by the Italians. It is difficult to see what Ibn
Saud expects to gain by raising this point again, when it has been dealt with
[856 b—2]