مجموعة ٦/ ٢١(٢) "المملكة العربية السعودية: العلاقات مع حكومة بريطانيا: المفوضية السعودية في لندن والوزير البريطاني في جدة. تمديد معاهدة جدة." [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٩] (٧٦١/٣٣٨)

2
Enclosure.
Record of conversations in the course of interviews granted by His Majesty
King Abdul Aziz to Sir Reader Bullard and Mr. Rendel on March 20,
21 and 22, 1937. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba were
present throughout, and the Amir Feisal appeared on two occasions.
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Sir Reader Bullard interpreted.
First Interview, March 20.
The King began by laying down the principles which governed his life :
(1) his religion, (2) his determination to keep his name above reproach, and
(3) devotion to his religion and to the interests of his subjects. He was a self-made
man, having started with nothing in the world, and provided that he stuck
to his principles he was prepared to go back to nothing. Times were changing,
the pristine honesty of the world was declining, but he would never pursue a
crooked path. He believed in consulting everyone, but no one could lead him
by the nose. He would always speak to His Majesty’s Government frankly and
sincerely. All sorts of stories were afloat about his subservience to the Italians,
but he could assure His Majesty’s Government that they were nonsense.
Mr. Rendel said how much the King’s frankness was appreciated by members of
the Government in Great Britain, and Sir Reader Bullard said that he was
sure that the King was never suspected by His Majesty’s Government of
subservience to Italy, and that His Majesty’s Government knew that his policy
was directed to what was their object as well as his, viz., the maintenance of
the independence of Saudi Arabia.
2. Ibn Sand said that he was a Moslem first of all, but he believed that of
all the European Powers the one with whom it was to the advantage of the Arabs
everywhere to be on good terms was Great Britain. After some talk on these
lines Sir Reader Bullard took the opportunity to convey the thanks of His
Majesty’s Government for the advice which the King had given to the Mufti
of Jerusalem when the mufti appealed for his help recently (Foreign Office
telegram No. 12 of the 1st March). The King expressed pleasure at this mark
of appreciation of his efforts and repeated what he had said to the mufti (he
had advised him to co-operate with the British in maintaining order and to
await the result of the Royal Commission), and he said that he had also warned
the mufti not to let himself be made an instrument for Italian intrigues. He went
on to say that he wanted the whole £< bundle ” of Arab States to be on good terms
with His Majesty’s Government. He was not thinking of Palestine for the
moment; that question was being considered, and he trusted that a solution
would be found that would be satisfactory to His Majesty’s Government, to the
people of Palestine, and to the Arabs in general. No, he was thinking of danger
which threatened the Arab world in two places, the Yemen, and Iraq.
3. First the \ emen. I he Yemen was in a ferment. The whole country was
against the heir apparent, Ahmad, while the Imam said “yes” to everyone,
but did nothing. When three of the sons of the Imam came on the pilgrimage
recently, Sayyid Husain spoke to the King about the situation in the Yemen
and asked for his advice. If there was a revolt in the Yemen, what would be
the attitude of (1) Ibn baud, and (2) the Italians ? According to Sayyid Husain—
and Ibn baud knew it to oe true—the whole population without exception hated
Ahmad and the Foreign Minister, Raghib, a Turk who is in Italian pay. They
had asked for the removal of Raghib, but he was protected by Ahmad. They
had sent the Imam a written protest (here the King gave us a copy), but without
eflfect. If they were free they would revolt and sweep away both Raghib and
Ahmad, and the Imam too if he opposed this popular movement
4. To this enquiry from Sayyid Husain, Ibn Sand said he had replied that,
as foi himself, he proposed to observe a policy of complete neutrality and
non-intei vention m Temen affairs. He had withdrawn once when he might have
occupied the Yemen, and he did not propose to reverse that policy. If there
should be tiquble in the Yemen, the most he could do would be to consult other
Ai ab countries if asked by both sides to try to make peace, and to see what could
be done to give effect to the request. As to Great Britain and Italy, Ibn Sand
had told Husain about the Rome understanding of 1927, and had said that both
the British and the Italians had assured him that it was their firm desire that