"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٣‎٤] (٤٥٤/٢٧٣)

244 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
territory beyond what was necessary to expel the Turks. More
over, the Turkish force from Shaiba was at that time still
in the Nasiriya area and General Nixon informed General
Townshend that he might have to go there to clear up the
situation before advancing from Qurna. In the course of the
discussion, General Nixon told General Townshend that the
force in Mesopotamia was intended to make good the old
province of Basra, i.e., the triangle contained by Basra-Nasiriya-
Amara, but that the Government considered that this was as
much as could be achieved by the available troops.
On the same day, General Nixon reported to India that there
was for the time being no urgency for operations against the
enemy on the Tigris, for which careful preparation and organisa
tion were necessary. He said that he was taking measures
to this end, but that he must await the result of General
Gorringe’s operations before making further definite plans.
General Nixon appears to have come to the conclusion soon
after the battle of Shaiba that heliums would afford the
necessary means for an attack on the Turkish positions north
of Qurna. It will be recollected that some time before this a
helium squadron had been organised in the force and that
battalions had been training men to propel or paddle these
boats. On the 18th April, each battalion at Qurna received
orders to increase the numbers of men so trained up to two
hundred and on the 27th, at General Nixon’s request, General
Townshend went into the question of utilising heliums. It
was decided to provide some eighty of these for each battalion
of the attacking line and, of them, thirty-two were to be
armoured by fixing machine-gun shields across their bows.
Arrangements to obtain and prepare the additional heliums
required and to mount guns and machine guns on rafts, etc.,
as well as to provide floating hospital accommodation, would
all take time and careful organisation. At this time, however,
and for the greater part of May, the operations in Arabistan
required the services of most of the available river craft up
the Karun river, so that delay was in any case inevitable.
During May the Turks on the Tigris, though continuously
engaged in strengthening their positions, displayed little
offensive activity. They w r ere, of course, in no great strength
here and the floods must have been as troublesome to them
as they were to us. Periodically a few of their guns would
fire a few rounds ; and there was a certain amount of sniping,
notably by Arabs in boats in the neighbourhood of Qurna. On
the 5th May, an attack by a friendly Arab Shaikh on a hostile